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Abstract
We investigate the e¤ects of European integration on corporate tax competition. Both
economic and monetary integration result in lower transaction costs in nancial markets -
by reducing capital controls, red tape and exchange rate uncertainty - and thereby in higher
capital mobility. Nevertheless, monetary integration leads to a common pool problem vis-
a-vis the shared revenues from issues of the common currency and to higher tax revenue
needs due to lower ination and the decit constraints embedded in the stability pact.
Economic integration may lead to access to better technologies, for the less developed
members. It will also lead to more tax-responsive capital and higher user-cost of capital
due to the abolition of tari¤s. We show that monetary integration leads to lower taxes,
while economic integration leads to higher taxes. Furthermore, we nd robust evidence of
a race-to-bottom e¤ect. Throughout, we investigate the impact of EU enlargement.
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1 Introduction
European Union (EU) is a major economic player in the world and a market that was based on
what is known as the four basic freedoms, i.e. freedom of movement for goods (and hence no
tari¤s), services (and hence improvement in average quality of nancial institutions and lower
transaction costs), labor (leading to knowledge spillovers and improvements in average quality
of technologies) and capital (leading to higher capital mobility). Moreover, the introduction,
in most member countries, of the euro as a common currency creates a homogeneous monetary
platform since it reduces exchange rate uncertainty, leading to a further decrease in transaction
costs. It also leads to seignorage sharing.1 It may also lead to lower ination and public debt,
if the move is associated with improvements in credibility of monetary-policy setting, and
controls on national scal policies to reduce free-riding and pressures to the central monetary
authorities to monetize national debts. All these can potentially have an impact on capital
taxation in the Eurozone.
Aggregated at the EU level, total taxes collected represent today just fewer than 40% of
GDP (compared to just fewer than 30% for the US and for Japan). The total tax burden has
gradually increased between 1970 and the end of the last century. This increase is, in general,
in conict with the standard mechanism of tax competition, which has been the focus of an
extensive literature. In fact, as the received literature has emphasized, the outcome of capital
tax competition is indeed rather complex and depends on various characteristics.2 Indeed, the
outcome of non-cooperative capital-tax setting will depend, among others, on the (a)symmetry
in the size and endowments of countries. The geographical location and the concentration of
production, such as the existence of a core-periphery model, will also a¤ect optimal levels of
taxation across regions (Baldwin and Krugman, 2004; Devereux et. al., 2007a). In addition,
trade between members of a union may lead to specialization and hence di¤erent equilibrium
levels of taxation (Wilson, 1987). Echoing the theoretical literature, empirical studies also
1The income of the European Central Bank is distributed between the national central banks, with the
national banks being ultimately under the (nancial) control of national governments. For the rules and
provisions of the allocation of income between the national central banks see the .Protocol on the Statute
of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank., especially Articles 28-33,
(http://www.ecb.int/ecb/legal/pdf/en_statute_2.pdf).
2For some surveys of the capital tax competition literature, see Wilson (1999) and Brueckner (2003).
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have shown that the availability of multiple tax instruments besides capital taxation (Rodrik,
1999 a,b), and the existence of international spillovers in public goods (Slemrod, 2004) and the
degree of mobility of the factor(s) of production (Devereux and Gri¢ th, 1998; Garretsen and
Peeters, 2007) inuence the e¤ects of tax competition.
In this paper, we provide some theoretical results and investigate empirically the e¤ects
of economic and monetary integration on capital taxes. We take a general look at both the
theoretical and empirical modelling of interactions in corporate tax setting, and ask some
fundamental questions not yet addressed by the previous literature. On the theory level, we
investigate the e¤ects of tari¤s, seignorage and technological changes on capital-tax setting.
Special emphasis is placed on the dynamics of capital taxation in the presence of money, and
possible links are drawn with the recent experience of European integration.3 Turning to our
empirical investigation we, rst, ask to what extent the joint estimation of both spatial and
economic interactions a¤ects the coe¢ cients on the traditional regressor matrix in empirical
corporate tax studies? Second, how robust are estimated spatial and economic relationships in
tax patterns across alternative model specications and di¤erent country groups? Given the
existing literature, an obvious issue to examine in this regard is di¤erences across samples of
European Union (before and after the expansion of EU). Furthermore, because of the nature
of spatial and economic e¤ects, it is necessary to examine the simultaneous estimation of
di¤erences across geographic and economic sub-samples. Finally, we ask, to what extent can
we measure the impact of the overall e¤ects of economic and monetary integration on capital
taxes?
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In the next section we present and
discuss our theoretical model. In Section 3 we discuss our empirical model. Section 4, presents
the data, while Section 5 illustrates the denition of weights. Econometric issues are discussed
in Section 6, and estimation results are presented in Section 7. Finally, Section 8 concludes.
3 In Makris (2006) the focus is on capital tax externalities in a monetary union, in a static framework.
Furthermore, in Makris (2008) the focus is on capital tax externalities in a model without money, in a two-
period model. Here, however, the set-up is fully dynamic and both the cases of monetary autonomy and union
are discussed and compared.
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2 A Monetary Model of Capital Tax Competition
Here, we present a model with money and capital taxation under (imperfect) capital mobil-
ity. Its objective is to describe a particular mechanism of policy interdependencies between
horizontally-related national governments. The precise nature of these interdependencies will
be tested in Section 3-7.
2.1 The Economy
Our framework is the standard capital taxation model of Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986) and
Wilson (1986), appropriately modied to incorporate dynamics, money holdings, imperfect
capital mobility and use of tari¤s and public debt. There are J > 1 countries. Each country
j = 1; :::; J is populated by Nj citizens indexed by i = 1; :::; Nj . Time periods are indexed by
t = 1; 2; 3; :::.
There is a single, composite and traded good. Assume for simplicity that there are no
transportation costs. The single good of each period is produced in each and every country
by means of combining capital and a xed in supply factor of production, like land.4 Capital
in period t is an intermediate good which is produced at the end of period t   1 by means
of using the composite good as an input. Assume without loss of generality that one unit of
the composite good can be transformed into one unit of capital. The supply of capital in the
rst-period, t = 1; is pre-determined (by the associated use of the single good in the past).
Consider now the market for (nancial) capital. It is assumed, for expositional simplicity,
that only agents from these J countries can trade, possibly at some transaction costs, in this
market.5 Perfect competition is the mode of trade in this market. Capital, Kjt; is ordered by
4The case of immobile between regions factors of production that are nevertheless non-xed in supply would
add additional complications without adding much in terms of insight. Arguably, in reality there are often
production factors other than capital that are also mobile between regions. An example is labour. Nevertheless,
it is also true that (nancial) capital is in general more mobile than labour. For an important work along these
lines see Kessler et. at. (2002). Note however that in that work the dynamics inherent in the accumulation of
capital over time, the presence of money and the use of tari¤s, which we emphasise, among others, here, are
given short drift as there the model is static and with no money and tari¤s. A very interesting line of future
theoretical work would be to combine the set-ups of our paper and Kessler et. al. (2002).
5This assumption is without loss of generality qualitatively insofar we postulate that the J countries face a
net supply of capital which is increasing with the world interest rate. In e¤ect, allowing for capital trade between
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the country-j rm at the end, and bought at prices, of period t 1. Also, to simplify exposition,
let us assume that (nancial) capital is supplied directly by households. Let t denote the net
(or aftertax) real interest rate in this common market for capital.6
We assume that governments choose their policies to maximize welfare in their jurisdic-
tions. We assume, for simplicity of exposition, that countries are small. In other words, the
number of countries J is very large so that governments perceive the net real interest rates
over time as being out of their control, despite the fact that eventually net real interest rates
are endogenously determined by capital-market-clearing. The latter is discussed shortly.
2.1.1 The Governments
National governments produce local public goods by means of a technology that uses the private
good as an input. Assume without loss of generality that the marginal product of the private
good is equal to one. Expressed in real terms, denote with Gjt the level of public good. Fiscal
revenue requirements are nanced by means of a per-unit tax on real capital used domestically,7
the J countries and the rest of the world would only result in a less responsive interest rate to national scal
policies. The assumption that the J countries do not trade in capital with the rest of the world could also be
justied with reference to EMU and evidence that location decisions of US based multinationals have not been
signicantly a¤ected by di¤erences in e¤ective tax rates across the Atlantic, while tax di¤erences within Europe
have had a signicant e¤ect (see Devereux and Gri¢ th, 1998).
6The single market for capital is a short-cut representation of national nancial capital markets that foreigners
have access to, with no arbitrage opportunities. Let ijt be the nominal interest rate in country j and period t: Let
the before-tax price of the single good in country j in period t be Pjt: We then have that under that alternative
representation, ~jt is the real interest rate paid in period t by region-j rms to investors who have channeled
their period-t   1 savings to country j: That is, 1 + ~jt  (1 + ijt)Pjt 1Pjt : Also, ~ jt is a tax paid by consumers
on the nominal interest rate, and jt is a per-unit transaction cost. So the income per-unit of investment in
country j0s period-t capital is 1 + ~jt   jt   ~ jtijt Pjt 1Pjt . No arbitrage implies that the net real interest rates
~jt jt  ~ jtijt Pjt 1Pjt ; for any j; are equalized across regions. Thus, investors are indi¤erent over the allocation
of their savings to domestic or non-domestic capital. Also, Kjt equals the total real capital channelled to region
j: Letting then t denote the common net-of-tax real interest rate across regions, and  jt  ~ jtijt Pjt 1Pjt makes
the two representations equivalent.
7To understand this let Pjt be the before-tax price of consumption: Let ^ jt be a tax imposed on the domestic
rms period-t   1 spending on capital used for production in period t: Then,  jt  ^ jt Pjt 1Pjt One can also
combine this with the environment of the previous footnote. In this case, rms pay ^ jt
Pjt 1
Pjt
for each unit of
capital, and we have  jt  ^ jt Pjt 1Pjt + ~ jtijt
Pjt 1
Pjt
:
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 jt; a tax on expenditures on imports (a tari¤), jt; and issues of new money and public debt:
8
To discuss issuing of new money and public debt in more detail, let Djt be the real level of
country-j period t outstanding public debt, in terms of period t 1 consumption in country j.
Assuming no arbitrage between private and public bonds, the country-j governments period t
total debt liabilities, in terms of period t consumption in country j, are (1 + t)Djt: On
the other hand, the country-j governments period t debt revenues, in terms of period t
consumption in country j, are Djt+1:
Concerning money creation, we follow the accounting convention that national govern-
ments are responsible for circulating the currency used domestically regardless of the degree
of monetary integration. Specically, the circulated money will be the national currency when
the country is not a member of a monetary union. It will, however, be replaced by the com-
mon currency following monetary integration. However, while in the former case the domestic
governments are the ones who decide on the level of issued money, in the latter case, the cur-
rency is issued on behalf of the over-arching central bank. Let jt denote ination in country
j in period t. Under monetary independence ination rates may di¤er across countries. Un-
der monetary integration, however, countries face the same ination rate.9 Let t denote the
union-wide ination rate in period t: In what follows, we will be using jt generically as the
ination rate of region j: It will be implied that, under a monetary union, jt = t for any j:
For expositional simplicity, we use, with some abuse of notation, the same letter for real money
supply under both institutional cases. In more detail, let Mjt be the real value of the currency
under circulation in period t 1 in country j, in terms of period t 1 consumption in country
j. Given this level of real money, the country-j government issues at the start of period t new
money such thatMjt+1 is the real value of the currency under circulation in period t in country
j, in terms of period t consumption in country j. Therefore, the real revenues generated by
issues of new money in period t in country j, what we will refer to as national seignorage,
are equal to Mjt+1   (1   jt)Mjt in period t: Note, thus, that the period t ination rate is
e¤ectively a tax on period t  1 real money stock:
Under monetary independence, governments enjoy exclusively their national seignorage:
8The model could easily be extended to the case of governments using also a tax on consumption expenditures
and a tax on income from the xed factor (i.e. a rents tax):We choose not to do so here for expositional simplicity.
9This follows directly from the absence, in equilibrium, of arbitrage with respect to union-currency issued
and circulated in di¤erent regions.
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Under monetary integration, however, regions share the union-wide seignorage created by the
new issues of the common currency across countries. Let ajt be the share of national seignor-
age retained by the national government. Assume also that each j countrys claims on the
seignorage contributions of countries v and v0 are the same for any v and v0: It follows that the
seignorage the government in country j enjoys is equal to
ajt(Mjt+1   (1  jt)Mjt) + 1
J   1
MX
v=1
v 6=j
(1  avt)(Mvt+1   (1  vt)Mvt)
with,10 for any j = 1; :::; J;
ajt = 1;under monetary autonomy, and
ajt 2 (0; 1); under monetary integration.
Let, in what follows,
jt  1
J   1
MX
v=1
v 6=j
(1  avt)(Mvt+1   (1  vt)Mvt):
Denote by Cjt and Yjt the country-j period-t real consumption and private good produc-
tion, respectively. It follows that the period t budget constraint of government in country j
is
Gjt =  jtKjt + ajt(Mjt+1   (1  jt)Mjt) +Djt+1   (1 + t)Djt
+jt(Cjt   Yjt) + jt:
2.1.2 The Firms
Let us turn to the description of the private sector. In each country j, a rm produces
period-t output using technology AjtFj [Kjt]; with F 0 > 0; F 00 < 0; where Ajt is a technology
parameter:11 Implicit in Fj [:] is the xed factor, which is suppressed for expositional conve-
10To understand the second part of the above formula, let rst #vj be the share of v countrys seignorage
contribution appropriated by country j; with
P
j 6=v #
v
j = 1 for any v = 1; ::; J: So, the appropriated seignorage
from abroad by country j is
P
v #
v
j (1   avt)(Mvt+1   (1   vt)Mvt): After letting #vj = #v
0
j  #j for any
j; v; v0 = 1; :::; J; v 6= j; v0 6= j and using Pj 6=v #vj = 1 for any v = 1; :::J we have (J   1)Pj #j = J: Thus,
(J   1)(1 + #j) = J for any j = 1; :::; J: Hence #j = 1J 1 for any j = 1; :::; J:
11We will be using square brackets to denote functions, and brackets to denote collected terms in multiplica-
tions.
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nience. Real prots are
jt = (1 + jt)(AjtFj [Kjt] + (1  jt)Kjt)  (1 + t + jt +  jt)Kjt:
In the above, jt is a per-unit transaction cost on purchases of real capital: It captures, in a
compact way, transaction costs in nancing period-t real capital in country j. Also, jt is the
depreciation rate of real capital: Note that
Yjt = AjtFj [Kjt] + (1  jt)Kjt:
Prot-maximisation for given prices and policies implies that
F 0j [Kjt] = rjt; (1)
where
rjt 
t + jt + jt +  jt   jt(1  jt)
Ajt(1 + jt)
(2)
is the capitals user-cost. So, capital is a decreasing function of its user-cost rjt : Kjt = Kj [rjt]
with K 0j = 1=F
00
j < 0: It follows directly from (2) that capital demand is decreasing with the
net interest rate t; the depreciation rate jt; the transaction costs jt and the capital tax  jt;
and is increasing with the tari¤ jt and technology Ajt: Also, we have
jt = (1 + jt)Ajtj [rjt];
where
j [rjt]  Fj [Kj [rjt]]  F 0j [Kj [rjt]]Kjt[rj ]
is the before-tax/subsidies return to the xed factor as a proportion of the technological para-
meter Ajt.
2.1.3 The Consumers
For resident i in country j; preferences in period t are dened over consumption, Cijt, national
public good, Gjt and real money balances held at the end of period t, M ijt+1: Real money
balances here are dened as the units of the composite good that can be purchased in the
period in question with the nominal money holdings acquired in that period:To understand
the preferences over real money balances, note that here we focus on the role of money as a
medium of exchange that reduces transaction costs associated with purchases of goods. That
8
is, individuals are viewed as beneting from the ow of services yielded by money holdings.
These services can be thought of as a description of the advantages of intermediate exchange.
These advantages arise from the fact that converting illiquid assets to purchasing power and
arranging barter transactions are costly, in terms of time and resources, activities. So, what
matters, in terms of welfare, is the command of money holdings over goods or some measure
of the transaction services that money holdings provide. In money-in-utility models, like the
one here, the utility derived from the ow of services yielded by money holdings is related to
the value, in terms of the composite good, of money holdings: In fact, models with money in
utility can be viewed as shortcuts of models where money helps to reduce the time needed to
purchase consumption goods.12 In the context of our model, the presumption is that citizens
gain utility from the real money balances they have at the end of a period, by economizing
on the transaction costs that are involved in purchasing consumption goods at the end of that
period.13 So, let temporal utility be
U ij [C
i
jt;M
i
jt+1]H
i
j [Gjt]:
Assume that U ijC > 0; U
i
jCC < 0; H
i0
j > 0; H
i00
j < 0; and U
i
jM > 0: Preferences over public good
are assumed to be separable for expositional simplicity.
Each citizen i in country j, decides in each period t upon her consumption, real money
demand and purchases of real bonds (private and public) Bijt+1 carried forward into the next
period. In each period, her income consists of (a) her share of the net-of-tax/subsidies remu-
neration of the domestic xed factor, (b) the returns from bonds brought forward from the
previous period, and (c) the real money holdings brought forward from the previous period.
12Our results would be qualitatively similar if we have had, instead, a cash-in advance model. See Blanchard
and Fischer (1989) Ch 4, Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (1996) Chs 8.1-8.3 and Walsh (2003) Chs 2 and 3 for some excellent
discussions of the issues involved in modeling money in an analytically tractable way.
13An alternative environment would postulate that consumers gain utility from the real money balances they
have at the start of a period, by economizing on the transaction costs that are involved in purchasing consumption
goods at the end of that period. This assumption makes the timing of acquiring and using money more consistent
with cash-in-advance models. See also Lucas (1982) and Carlstrom and Fuest (2001). Note that our results are
qualitatively robust to allowing for this alternative timing.
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The period-t budget constraint of consumer i in country j is given, in real terms, by:
Bijt+1 +M
i
jt+1 + (1 + jt)C
i
jt =
(1 + t)B
i
jt + (1  jt)M ijt + ijt(1 + jt)Ajt[rjt];
where ijt is the consumer i
0s share of the domestic xed factor in period t: Note here that
the current user-cost of capital a¤ects negatively the current net returns to the xed factor
and hence consumers income. Also, the current net real interest rate a¤ects positively the
real returns to the past holdings of bonds. Moreover, current ination a¤ects negatively the
real returns to past money holdings. Furthermore, the current tari¤ increases the after-tax
price of consumption, while it increases the current net returns to the xed factor and hence
consumersincome.
After dening with ij the discount factor of consumer i in country j, utility maximisation
for given prices and policies gives period-t demands for real money balancesM ijt+1[t; rjt; xjt; s
i
jt; Ajt]
and bonds Bijt+1[t; rjt; xjt; s
i
jt; Ajt]; and a consumption function C
i
jt[t; rjt; xjt; s
i
jt; Ajt], where
xjt  fjt; jtg and sijt  fBijt;M ijtg: Note that, for expositional simplicity, we have sup-
pressed here, and in what follows, the dependence of the various functions on jt and ijt:
Thus,14 equilibrium demands depend on (a) current prices, policies and technological para-
meters, t; rjt; xjt; Ajt, (b) past savings, with the latter being in the form of both bonds and
money holdings, sijt; and (c) anticipated future prices, policies and technological parameters.
The latter is captured in a compact way by the time-dependence of the above demand func-
tions. Note that the above optimal demands depend on rjt and Ajt due to their impact
on current income from the xed factor. Denote the resulting temporal indirect utility by
V ijt[t; rjt; xjt; s
i
jt; Ajt]H
i
j [Gjt]:
Let us assume normality of consumption. Also, as it seems to be a natural assumption
given the postulated value of using money in our context, let us assume that
U ijC [C
i
jt+v ;M
i
jt+v+1]
U ijM [C
i
jt+v ;M
i
jt+v+1]
is strictly decreasing with Cijt+v for any v = 0; :::;1: That is, higher consumption raises the
relative desirability of holding money. This, in turn, implies (see Appendix A), in conjuction
with normality of consumption, that money is also a normal good. Thus, an increase in the
user-cost of capital, which reduces capital and thereby income from the xed factor, leads to a
reduction, all other things equal, in consumption and money demand. Given that an increase
14The derivation of these functions is standard. We discuss it briey in the Appendix A, for completeness.
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in period-t ination also reduces current income, we also have that consumption and money
demand are strictly decreasing with current ination.
2.1.4 Private Equilibrium
Equilibrium in the market for capital i period t is given by15
X
j
Kj [rjt] =
X
j
(
X
i
Bijt  Djt)  Kt: (3)
The left-hand side is the total demand for capital. The right-hand side is the total supply of
capital. Notice that in period t; the supply of capital, Kt; is pre-determined by the actions of
consumers and governments in period t   1. Recall the denition of capitals user-cost, (2).
Thus, market-clearing implies an equilibrium net real interest rate t = [~ t; ~t; ~t; ~At; Kt];
where ~  f1; :::; Jg; ~  f1; :::; Jg, ~  f1; :::; Jg; and ~A  fA1; :::; AJg: Clearly, higher
supply of capital, higher transaction costs and capital taxes, and lower technology and tari¤s
lead to a lower net real interest rate.
Equilibrium in the region-j market for money in period t; under both national and
common currencies; is given by
X
i
M ijt+1[t; rjt; xjt; s
i
jt; Ajt] =Mjt+1:
The left-hand side is the total demand for, and the right-hand side is the supply of, real money.
2.1.5 Policy-Setting
At this stage we can discuss what constitutes monetary policy in our set-up. Given the equilib-
rium net real interest rate, and the regional user-costs of capital and import taxes, the above
equilibrium condition determines implicitly a relationship between ination jt and real money
supply Mjt+1: Given that demand for real money in period t is strictly decreasing with current
ination jt; we have that this relationship is strictly negative. Hence, one can think of national
governments setting (independently or on behalf of the union central bank) domestic ination
and adjusting their money supplies accordingly, so that money-market equilibrium is satised
given private decisions. This will be the convention we will follow hereafter.
15Given equilibrium in the market for money, and that capital is an intermediate good supplied by consumers,
capital-market-clearing is equivalent to equilibrium in the market for the composite traded good.
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We focus on credible policy-setting by national governments. In more detail, govern-
ments choose their policies, in each period, after savings (i.e. money and asset holdings) are
determined but before rms decide on their capital demands. Note that in such an environment
the supply of capital in each period is pre-determined. Nevertheless, capital taxes do a¤ect
the allocation of capital between regions. Therefore, capital tax competition is still possible.
So, we investigate an environment where governments compete for a given stock of capital on
a period-per-period basis. We also assume, as it is standard in analysis of credible tax-setting,
that
P
j Nj is very large so that consumers perceive themselves very small to a¤ect current
and, crucially, future policies.
It is well known that in dynamic non-cooperative games multiplicity of equilibria may
arise. We focus on sub-game perfect equilibria in di¤erentiable (pure) Markov tax-strategies.
For a discussion of the advantages of Markov strategies in dynamic games see Fudenberg and
Tirole (1992) Ch. 13. Di¤erentiability is required for analytical simplicity.
Markov strategies imply that actions in a given period depend on past history only
through the state. The state is a (possibly multi-dimensional) variable which summarizes
the inuence of past interactions on the current strategic environment. In other words, the
state is the minimal information in the history of a game which is relevant for the strategic
interaction between players. In our context, the state in any period t; Qt; is the money and
bond holdings, and the public debt issued, in the previous period in each region, i.e. Qt 
fQjtgJj=1  fM1jt; :::;MNjjt ; B1jt; :::; BNjjt ; DjtgJj=1:
In a Markov Perfect Equilibrium (MPE), national policies,  jt; Djt+1 and xjt; j = 1; :::; J;
in each period t are a Nash equilibrium given the state Qt and the rationally anticipated
response of all regional governments with respect to their future policies to period-t-policy-
induced changes in future states (ination is taken as given under monetary integration). Gov-
ernments take also into account the e¤ects of their policies on the optimal behaviour of rms
and consumers.
2.1.6 Non-Cooperative Capital Taxes
For our purposes it is su¢ cient to focus on the setting of the current capital taxes  jt; in
some region j; for given period-t (MPE) ination rate, jt, public debt policy, djt  Djt+1,
and taxes on imports, jt; and foreign transfers, jt: So, let Tjt[Qjt] be the corresponding
Markov tax-strategy of j government, with Tjt[:] being di¤erentiable. Note that we have
12
suppressed the dependence of Tjt[:] on jt; xjt; djt; Ajt; jt; ajt and ft; t+1; :::g for expositional
simplicity. Let also Wjt[Qt; t] denote the period t value function of the j government for
given net real interest rate and state, after having suppressed its dependence on ajt; Ajt; jt and
ft+1; t+2; :::gfor expositional simplicity: Furthermore, let Qjt+1[Qjt; rjt; xjt; djt; t] represent
in a compact way the state-evolution in a MPE, after suppressing for expositional simplicity its
dependence on Ajt: That is, we have that in a MPE Qjt+1 = Qjt+1[Qjt; rjt; xjt; djt; t] describes
in a compact way the following:
Djt+1 = djt;
M ijt+1 = M
i
jt+1[t; rjt; xjt; s
i
jt; Ajt];
Bijt+1 = B
i
jt+1[t; rjt; xjt; s
i
jt; Ajt].
We then have that Markov tax-strategies, for any given xjt; djt; Ajt; jt; jt; ajt and
ft; t+1; :::g, are given by:16
max

f
X
i
V ijt[t; rjt; xjt; s
i
jt; Ajt]H
i
j [Gjt] + 
i
jWjt+1[Qt+1; t+1]g
subject to Qjt+1 = Qjt+1[Qjt; rjt; xjt; djt; t];
Gjt = Kj [rjt] + djt   (1 + t)Djt
+ajt(
X
i
M ijt+1[t; rjt; xjt; s
i
jt; Ajt]  (1  jt)Mjt) + jt
+jt
X
i
Cijt[t; rjt; xjt; s
i
jt; Ajt]
 jt(AjtFj [Kj [rjt]] + (1  jt)Kj [rjt]); and
rjt 
t + jt + jt +    jt(1  jt)
Ajt(1 + jt)
:
Note that, for any given net real interest rate, foreign policies have no direct impact on domestic
decisions insofar foreign transfers remain una¤ected.
After using the envelope theorem, the rst order condition (f.o.c.) is:
Ejt = 0;
16For more details see Appendix B.
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where
Ejt  (1  jt[rjt;  jt; Ajt; jt] +Rjt)jt (4)
  1
1 + jt
+jt:
In the above condition,
jt[rjt;  jt; Ajt; jt]   
 jt
Ajt(1 + jt)
K 0j [rjt]
Kj [rjt]
(5)
is the tax-elasticity of capital. Furthermore, jt is a measure of the marginal e¤ect of the capital
tax, through the capitals user-cost, on future welfare, relative to current national capital. In
general, the sign of this is ambiguous; it depends, among others, on the income elasticity of
savings.17 In addition, Rjt is the marginal e¤ect of the capital tax, through the capitals user-
cost, on seignorage and the government revenues from tari¤, relative to current national capital:
Note that the sign of it is ambiguous. On the one hand, a capital-tax-induced increase in the
capitals user-cost reduces, by normality, money demand and consumption, and hence revenues
from seignorage and taxes on imports. On the other hand, a capital-tax-induced increase in
the capitals user-cost reduces demand for capital and hence output, which, in turn, implies an
increase in revenues from tari¤s. Moreover, jt > 0 is the total marginal utility of the public
good relative to the total marginal utility of private consumption weighted by the share of the
xed factor. jt; Rjt and jt are stated formally in Appendix C.
The f.o.c. above represents, as a proportion of current capital and the total weighted
marginal utility from consumption, the balance in equilibrium between the marginal cost,
1
1+jt
; and the marginal benet, (1 jt[rjt;  jt; Ajt; jt]+Rjt)jt+jt, of a higher capital tax.
The former arises from the decrease in the current income from the xed factor, and hence in
current consumption, due to higher capital-user-cost. The latter consists of a number of e¤ects.
In more detail, (1   jt[rjt;  jt; Ajt; jt])jt represents the marginal welfare benet from the
net increase in current government revenues, and hence public good provision, from capital
taxation. Furthermore, Rjtjt represents the marginal welfare e¤ect from the net change in
current government revenues from issuing money and taxing imports. Finally, jt represents
17For a theoretical investigation of jt in a related model see Makris (2008). There the emphasis is on the
intertemporal externalities that emerge when capital is taxed in a two-period environment.
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the marginal welfare e¤ect from the net change in future consumption, private and public, due
to tax-induced changes in the future state and thereby in future policies.
2.1.7 The Capital Tax Reaction Function
With a view to our forthcoming empirical investigation let us discuss here the dependence
of MPE capital taxes on various policies and the output-augmenting technologies. We have
that (4) determines implicitly the equilibrium tax in period t and region j as a function of
the national capital user-cost, rjt; public-good valuation, jt; tari¤s, jt; output-augmenting
technology, Ajt, and the marginal e¤ects Rjt and jt:  jt = ~ jt[rjt; jt; jt; Ajt;jt; Rjt]:
Note from (4) and (5) that Ejt is strictly decreasing with the capital tax for any given
rjt; jt; jt;jt; Rjt and Ajt: We, therefore, have that the sign of the partial derivative of Ejt
with respect to any of these determinants of the capital tax gives us also the direction of the
this determinants e¤ect on the capital tax. Note then, by totally di¤erentiating Ejt for given
capital tax, and using (4) once again, that
d jt _ jtdRjt + djt
+f 1
(1 + jt)
2
+ jt
jt
(1 + jt)
gdjt
+jt
jt
Ajt
dAjt (6)
+jt
 jt
Ajt(1 +Bjt)
@(K 0j [rt]=K
0
j [rjt])
@rjt
drjt
+f
1
1+jt
  jt
jt
gdjt:
The fth term above represents the standard user-cost e¤ect. This e¤ect arises as a
higher user-cost, all other things equal, leads to a change in the tax-elasticity of capital that
has the opposite sign of
@(K0j [rjt]=K
0
j [rjt])
@rjt
: So, if the latter is positive - as it is often assumed in the
standard capital tax competition literature (and is the case with a Cobb-Douglas production
function F [k] = k) - we have that, when capital taxes are positive, a higher user-cost leads to
higher capital taxes. Assume hereafter to x ideas that, indeed,
@(K0j [rjt]=K
0[rjt])
@rjt
> 0: Thus the
user-cost e¤ect is positive. A straightforward implication, given that the capital user-cost and
transaction costs are positively related from (2), is the typical prediction that lower transaction
costs lead, all other things equal, to lower capital taxes.
The third term above represents the tari¤ e¤ect, and is positive. That is, a higher tari¤
will lead to a higher capital tax, all other things equal. The reason is that higher tari¤s lead
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to (a) higher consumer prices and thereby a lower capital-tax-induced decrease in income from
the xed factor and hence in consumption, (b) lower capital-tax-induced decrease in domestic
capital-tax base.
The fourth term above represents the technology e¤ect, and is also positive. That is, a
higher output-augmenting technology will lead to a higher capital tax, all other things equal.
The reason is that better production technology leads to a lower capital-tax-induced decrease
in domestic capital-tax base.
The sixth term above represents the public-good-valuation e¤ect. If public good provision
is increasing with the capital tax in equilibrium, i.e. 11+jt > jt, then this e¤ect is positive.
That is, a higher total marginal utility of the public good relative to the total weighted marginal
utility of private consumption will lead to a higher capital tax, all other things equal. The reason
is straightforward: if the capital tax is to the left of the La¤er curve, then higher relative
value for public good will lead to a higher capital tax. Assume hereafter, to x ideas, that,
indeed, in equilibrium, a higher capital tax will lead to more public good, and hence that the
e¤ect in question is positive.
Finally, we have the rst and second terms that represent the revenue and dynamic
e¤ects, respectively, and both are of positive sign. Starting from the revenue e¤ect, we thus
have that if the net capital-tax-induced gain in current revenues from seignorage and import
taxes, Rjt, increases, then, as intuition would suggest, the capital tax increases as well. Turning
to the dynamic e¤ect, if the net capital-tax-induced future welfare gain from a¤ecting future
economic actions, jt, increases, then the current capital tax will be higher, ceteris paribus.
Notice that jt; Rjt and jt depend also, among other important determinants, on import
taxation, output-augmenting technology, the user-cost of capital, the net real interest rate,
ination and past private savings. After some tedious calculations, one can see that the e¤ects
of these determinants on jt; Rjt and jt cannot be signed unambiguously unless further
restrictions are imposed on the fundamentals of the model. Given the empirical investigation
in the second part of the paper, we therefore abstain from discussing these e¤ects here. For
completeness, however, we do so in Appendix D.
Importantly, for the purposes of our study, jt depends also on the net increase in public
debt and money supply, on interest payments on past public debt and on seignorage sharing
under monetary integration - through their e¤ect on the level of public consumption. Speci-
cally, if a change in these determinants results in higher public consumption, then the relative
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valuation of public good decreases. As we have seen above, this will lead to higher capital
taxes.
Recall from (2) that the user-cost of capital depends positively on the net real interest
rate. The latter, however, is determined endogenously from the capital-market-clearing (recall
(3)). It follows then directly that the domestic user-cost of capital depends also on foreign
capital taxes, tari¤s, technologies and transaction costs. In fact, any change in these variables
that increases foreign user-costs of capital, will lead to lower demand for capital and hence a
lower net real interest rate. This, in turn, will imply a lower domestic user-cost of capital. One
can also easily see that the net e¤ects of domestic tari¤s, technology and transaction cost on
the domestic user-cost of capital have the signs of the corresponding direct e¤ects discussed
earlier (recall (2)).18
The above discussion indicates that domestic policies, and hence, capital tax depend on
foreign capital taxes,19 foreign and domestic transaction costs and output-augmenting tech-
nologies, the extend of seignorage sharing under monetary integration, exogenous restrictions
on tari¤s, issues of new public debt and money, and ination. In fact,20 with the empirical
investigation in mind, one can think of the following capital tax reaction function for country
j in period t:
 jt =  j [t; jt; djt; y

jt; E ; M ]; (7)
where, recall, djt denotes issues of new public debt in period t in country j; and jt denotes
the ination rate.
The dependence of the above tax-function on time index t captures the dependence
of the tax on the state of the economy (that summarizes the inuence of past decisions on
current strategic environment) and on expectations about future economic conditions. This
will be captured by time e¤ects, the e¤ect of lagged values of the domestic capital tax and by
18These are formally discussed in Appendix D.
19Foreign tari¤s and, under monetary autonomy, foreign ination rates are endogenously determined alongside
capital taxes across countries. One can then eliminate foreign tari¤s and ination rates from the conditions that
give capital taxes across countries, by using the equilibrium conditions for the determination of foreign tari¤s
and ination rates.
20Domestic tari¤s are also endogenously determined alongside capital taxes. One can then eliminate do-
mestic tari¤s from the condition that gives domestic capital taxes, by using the equilibrium condition for the
determination of domestic tari¤s.
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incorporating various control variables like population and unemployment.
Furthermore, yjt is a vector-variable that captures the inuence of foreign capital taxes,
and foreign variables like transaction costs and technology, on domestic tax-setting. Foreign
capital taxes will be one of the explanatory variables. The e¤ects of the foreign economic
conditions will be captured by the explicit consideration of economic neighboring e¤ects in our
econometric investigation.
Finally, E and M are indicator functions that capture the dependence of capital-tax
setting on the presence of economic integration - a la EU - and monetary integration - a la
EMU, respectively. Notice here that the monetary integration indicator function, M , captures
the impact of monetary integration on capital taxes over and above the impact that may result
from the possible e¤ects of monetary integration on ination and public debt.
The overall e¤ects of economic and monetary integration on capital taxes is the main
focus of our paper. Therefore, it is worth emphasising the anticipated implications for capital
taxes of European integration, given the predictions of our theoretical model above.
2.1.8 Some implications of Economic Integration
Economic Integration of the type that took place in Europe may have the following e¤ects.
First, it will improve capital mobility, represented here by a decrease in jt: The direct e¤ect
is to reduce the capitals user-cost and hence, by the user-cost e¤ect, to push towards lower
taxes. This e¤ect of higher capital mobility is the main ingredient of any existing model of
capital tax competition.21
Second, it will enforce zero tari¤s. The direct e¤ect of this is (recall the tari¤ e¤ect) a
decrease in capital taxes. An indirect e¤ect of a decrease in tari¤s, however, is an increase in
the user-cost. This, in turn implies, by the user-cost e¤ect, that capital taxes will increase, all
other things equal.
Third, through the mobility of knowledge and the improvements in the institutional and
legislative framework, it might lead to improvements in technology, represented here by an
increase in Ajt: This will have two main e¤ects for countries that were less developed prior
21An increase in capital mobility has also indirect e¤ects through the relative marginal valuation of public
good, the capital-tax-induced change in tari¤ revenues and seignorage, and the capital-tax-induced change in
future welfare. However, the corresponding net e¤ects cannot be signed unless further restrictions are imposed
on the fundamentals of the model.
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to integration. The direct e¤ect is (recall the technology e¤ect) an increase in capital taxes.
Improvements in technology, however, will also lead to a reduction in the user-cost of capital.
Thus, by the user-cost e¤ect, capital taxes will decrease, all other things equal.22
Therefore, economic integration will have an ambiguous e¤ect on capital taxes.
2.1.9 Some implications of Monetary Integration
Monetary Integration of the type that took place in Europe may have the following e¤ects.
First, it will (further) improve capital mobility. Hence, after recalling the corresponding dis-
cussion under economic integration, it may push towards (even) lower taxes.
Second, recall that entering a monetary union implies seignorage sharing. This is repre-
sented here by a decrease in the seignorage share ajt and a reduction in the foreign seignorage
shares (and hence an increase in the transfer jt; for any given levels of seignorage across
countries): By their impact on domestic public revenues, and thereby by the public-good-
valuation e¤ect, this will have two opposite e¤ects. In more detail, the rst is pushing for a
higher, while the latter for a lower capital tax. Moreover, a lower domestic seignorage share
increases Rjt: Therefore, by the revenue e¤ect it leads, all other things equal, to a higher capital
tax. So, seignorage sharing will have an ambiguous e¤ect on the capital tax. The exact e¤ect
will depend, among others, on the extend at which a country is a net contributor of seignorage.
That is, if entering a monetary union implies a net decrease in appropriated revenues from
issues of new money, then the capital tax will tend to increase.23
Therefore, monetary integration per se will also have an ambiguous e¤ect on capital
taxes. This e¤ect may also be asymmetric due to the possibly di¤erent reliance of countries on
seignorage prior to entering a monetary union.
We leave this section by noting that, through a possible reduction on average ination and
debt-nancing, monetary integration may also reduce public good provision, all other things
equal. In this case, the relative marginal valuation of the public good will increase and, by the
22 Improvements in technology and a reduction in tari¤s have also indirect e¤ects, through their impact on the
relative marginal valuation of public good, on the capital-tax-induced change in tari¤ revenues and seignorage,
and on the capital-tax-induced change in future welfare. However, the corresponding net e¤ects cannot be signed
unless further restrictions are imposed on the fundamentals of the model.
23The discussion here draws on unpublished work, within a very stylized two-period model, that had been
circulated by the second author in the past.
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public-good-valuation e¤ect, taxes will tend to increase. Lower ination will also, by normality,
increase consumption and money demand, and thereby revenues from tari¤s and issues of new
money. This, in turn, will lead, by the public-good-valuation e¤ect, to lower taxes. Lower levels
of public debt will also lead to higher supply of capital and hence a lower net real interest rate
and lower national user-costs of capital. This will tend to push to lower capital taxes, due to
the user-cost e¤ect. Thus, the net e¤ect of lower levels of public debt and ination will also be
ambiguous.24
We turn to the empirical investigation of capital taxes.
3 Empirical Specication
Our theoretical framework suggests that we want to estimate the reaction functions as charac-
terized above. Specically, in our set-up, tiq (the marginal tax rate) is the dependent variable.
Turning to the explanatory variables of the model, Devereux et. al. (2007) examine whether
discretionary government grants inuence where domestic and multinational rms locate new
plants, and how the presence of agglomeration externalities interact with these policy instru-
ments. Following their model we try to estimate the presence of neighboring e¤ects (clusters)
in marginal corporate taxes and we nd that both EU entrance and adoption of Euro have
an impact on the creation of agglomeration spillovers. Moreover, we include at the model a
country xed e¤ect i, a vector of country specic controls Xiq and a vector of dummy variables
Diq; related to the participation at the European Union (EU) and the adoption of Euro. The
general form of the discussed specication is
 it = i + ait
JX
j=1
j 6=i
wij jt + it
JX
j=1
j 6=i
sij jt + zit 1 it 1 + 0itXit + 
0
itDit + "it (8)
where i = 1 : : : J denotes a country, and t = 1 : : : k a time-period. Spatial weights are denoted
by w and economic weights by s. A detailed discussion about those weights follows at a
subsequent section. The expanded autoregressive model (8) is estimated as the standard spatial
24Reduction in ination and public debt levels have also indirect e¤ects, through the relative marginal valuation
for public good, the capital-tax-induced change in tari¤ revenues and seignorage, and the capital-tax-induced
change in future welfare. However, all corresponding net e¤ects cannot be signed unless further restrictions are
imposed on the fundamentals of the model.
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autoregressive model,25 provided that the above formulations of weights are su¢ ciently di¤erent
and do not contain entirely overlapping information. Moreover, we account for temporal e¤ects
(z) by including the lagged value of marginal tax rates. These temporal e¤ects stem, as theory
suggests, from the impact on consumersbehavior and scal revenue requirements of domestic
and foreign past bonds, debt and money.
The specication of equation (8) raises a number of issues for the empirical estimation.
Those issues are explicitly discussed at a following subsection.
4 Data
We present results using as a dependent variable corporate tax rates, and specically the top
national corporate tax rates. The sources of data are the World Development Indicators (2006),
European Commission (2006) and KPMGs Corporate Tax Rate Survey (2006). Those sources
provide information for a broad sample of countries, for the period 1975-2005. Figure 1 provides
an insight about GDP-weighted average taxes for the above period.
Add here Figure 1: Taxes as a % of GDP in EU
For several years (1970 1986), we observe an increase of the total tax burden, and a
small decline in the last three years. This hides of course a large diversity in levels and trends
across European Countries as well as the inuence of the economic cycle.
International comparability of the data is made possible through use of various controls
for di¤erences in coverage and denitions. We check for the robustness of empirical results for
capital tax rates when controls for di¤erences in coverage are included.
Explanatory variables26 also include the added value of Agricultural sector (Baunsgaard
and Keen, 2005) and trade as a fraction of GDP to measure openness. To control for the e¤ect
of prices, we include ination. This variable captures cost-of-living di¤erences not captured by
exchange rate conversions. As suggested by Devereux et al., (2007a) and Rodrik (1999a), we
also include the level of GDP to account for economic variation. We also augment our model
25The choice of the lag formulation is based on spatial diagnostic tests (LM-Error and LM-Lag).
26See Table A1 for summary statistics and information.
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specication with additional variables such as debt-to-GDP ratio, the level of market capital-
ization (in particular, market capitalization of listed companies (% of GDP)), unemployment as
a percentage of total labor force), wages (measured by workersremittances and compensation
of employees) and population. All these variables are highlighted in the literature27 as a means
of controlling for country and economic characteristics. Furthermore, to allow for the e¤ect of
European integration, we decompose it into two variables. One of these represents the entrance
of the country in the European Union and the second denotes the key year of adoption of the
common currency.
5 Weight Specication
An important decision in model estimation is the choice of the connectivity weights. Explana-
tory data analysis typically provides a possible way of getting information about the structure
of the data. However, a method that is often used in practice and suggested by the existed
literature is to apply some weight matrices in regression analysis and test for the presence (if
any) of dependence with each of the matrices.28 We employ in the regression analysis weighted
averages of tax rates in competing countries, following the standard spatial regression literature
as summarized by Anselin (1988). The spatial weight matrix for country i takes the form, Wi.
Its elements wij specify a neighborhood set for each observation i. In more detail, wij is
positive if j is a neighborof i, and zero otherwise. Indeed, this structure is given by what
is known as the connectivity matrix, which species the degree of connectivity (weights)
between any two observations.29 Essentially, we use the inverse distance-based matrix, where
weights30 are specied as a decaying function in space  that is, as wij = (dij) 2, with dij
denoting distance between countries i and j.
In our model, we consider many forms of the weighting matrix, based on economic criteria;
provided that the matrices are su¢ ciently di¤erent and that do not contain entirely overlapping
27See Devereux et al (2007a) and Rizzo (2007).
28For alternative specications of weight matrices see Anselin (1988).
29The assumption that these weights are known a priori is strong, although it is crucial for the method to
work. Of course, it is no stronger than the typical implicit assumption that all weights are zero, that is, all
observations are spatially independent.
30As a robustness exercise, we tested alternative spatial criteria and results do not present signicant variations.
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information31. First, countries are assigned to be neighbors if they have a similar level of
GDP. Actually, we discriminate among high and low GDP type countries by dividing the
sample into two groups. In a non-geographic context, the notion of distance is determined
by the relative magnitude of GDP and a country is connected to all other countries of the
same GDP-type (high-low). The GDP connectivity matrix di¤ers from any distance matrix in
two notable ways. First, the GDP matrix consists of weights where the importance of another
state j to state i is given by the relative magnitude of the GDP. Second, the GDP connectivity
matrix weights high type partners much more heavily than low type partners, whereas in the
distance matrix, any neighbor of i must always have j as a non-trivial neighbor. Therefore,
the elements of GDP connectivity matrix are dened as:
sij = 1 
GDPj  GDPiGDPj +GDPi
 (9)
and by construction, this index ranges from 0 to 1. In particular, if the proportion of GDP is
the same between the two countries, then sij = 1. The elements of GDP connectivity matrix
take the value of 0 if the the di¤erence in GDP values is really signicant. Notice that this
denition of similarity is symmetric in that sji = sij . Finally, it is created using the temporal
average values of each country.
A second form of the weighting matrix is based on market capitalization weights i.e.
countries with similar market capitalization (% of GDP). Thirdly, we dene weighted schemes
based on the wages and, nally, according to the aggregate export activities. The algebraic
denitions of those weights are similar to the one with the GDP specication. These weighting
matrices were used to create weighted averages of corporate tax rates in neighborcountries.
One interesting feature of the export matrix is that more-open countries have the bulk of
their export activities with large, wealthy, countries, which more often depict a higher demand
for capital. As a result, these countries will tend to have a higher connectivity lag(neighbors
with many over countries) than the distance based connectivity lag. In other words, the
magnitude of the discussed weight is greater than the corresponding distance based weight.
31For further details see Brueckner, 2003.
23
6 Econometric Issues
Before proceeding to the estimation of equation (8), we must deal with three econometric issues.
We use an instrumental variable approach to address endogeneity issues of control variables.
One obvious candidate as an instrument is the lagged value. However, given our theoretical
model, the lagged values themselves are endogenous, which would render them unsuitable as
instruments. A common approach in the literature is to generate instruments as the weighted
average of the explanatory variables in other countries.32 That is, for each element of Xit, it is
possible to construct a weighted average for other countries. These weighted averages can be
used directly as instruments for our model, and generate better instruments in the sense that
they are more highly correlated with the endogenous variables (Brueckner 2003; Revelli 2005).
As a result the standard errors tend to be smaller.
A second issue is that in practice, our tax rates are serially correlated, perhaps because
unexpected changes in the tax system are likely to be costly to governments, either because
such changes impose costs of adjustment on the private sector, or because such changes may be
blocked at the political level by interest groups who stand to lose from the change. There may
also be spatial correlation in the error terms. However, the lag formulation of equation (8) is
justied both in terms of the theoretical analysis and on the basis of the strategic competition
among the countries; and dominates any bias resulting from error components, (Devereux et
al., 2007a). Subsequently, we present t-statistics based on clustered standard errors (Devereux
et al., 2007) which are robust to both spatial correlation and serial correlation (Bertrand et al.,
2004).
Working with countries within the European Union and controlling for an array of macro-
economic variables does not ensure that most exogenous shocks that might result in spurious
evidence of tax reaction functions are accounted for. This is a third issue in our analysis. Thus,
we include country-specic xed e¤ects to capture shocks which are not common to all coun-
tries. The model is thus estimated both with and without year country e¤ects. As a robustness
32 In fact, although the presented theory of tax competition treats taxes as the outcome of a game in which
governments choose their taxes simultaneously, in practice scal policy takes time to design and implement and
it is likely that governments choose their tax variables based on the observed past choices of rival governments
rather than the anticipated ones. For these reasons, it is not the contemporaneous, but the lagged values of the
explanatory variables in the rival countries that are often included in estimated models (Goodspeed 2000, 2002).
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check we have used these e¤ects in di¤erent model specications.
7 Estimation Results
The suggested specication is tested over two alternative groups of countries in Europe (Euro-
pean Union of 17 members33 and European Union of 27 members34 that covers the latest major
expansion of EU). The suggested di¤erentiation allows for estimating the impact of expansion
of the union and adoption of euro at the existed and new members.
7.1 Adoption of Euro and EU entry
Equation (8) implies that if  and  are zero there will be no type of neighboring e¤ect. Without
the terms ait
PJ
j=1
j 6=i
wij jt and it
PJ
j=1
j 6=i
sij jt, equation (8) can be easily estimated provided
that the error process shows no temporal correlations, so that the lagged  it 1 is independent
of the error process.
The results for such a model are presented in Table 1 and refer to the EU of 17 mem-
bers. Model (1) presents OLS results of equation (8) without the variables that capture the
potential impact of EU entry and adoption of Euro. This is the benchmark model, without the
neighboring e¤ects, which is augmented further in Models 2-7. Specically, models (2) and (3)
show both the e¤ects of EU entry and Euro adoption separately. Models (4) and (5) present
Fixed E¤ect (FE) and Random E¤ect (RE) results for the basic specication of the model with
both e¤ects of EU entry and Euro adoption included. Finally, Models (6) and (7) present xed
e¤ect and random e¤ect results for the augmented specication of the model which controls
for various country and region characteristics.
Consistently with the results from the literature, we nd that the marginal tax of cor-
porate rates is a function of a number of economic (i.e., GDP) and social (i.e., population)
characteristics. Table 1 highlights that both the adoption of the Euro and the entrance in the
European Union impact on the magnitude and the direction of the corporate tax rates. How-
ever, there are both theoretical and empirical reasons that this is not the appropriate model
33 It refers to the case before the expansion of EU in 2004 and includes Switzerland and Norway.
34The largest expansion to date of the European Union took place when the Union was extended by 10
member-states: Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Hungary, Malta
and Cyprus. We excluded from our estimation Malta and Cyprus due to data limitations
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specication. First, our theoretical model suggests that other member countriestaxes should
play a role. Second, the initial equation fails the test of over-identifying restrictions, and there
is evidence of severe serial correlation. Moulton (1986) argued that estimation of an equation
like (8) by ordinary least squares is likely to lead to downward bias in the standard errors of
the coe¢ cients of the explanatory variables.
We address each of these problems in turn. First, because taxes change only infrequently,
we add a neighboring (spatially and economically dened) lagged dependent variable (refer to
Table 2 and Table 3). As it is well known, temporally lagged dependent variable is correlated
with the xed e¤ects, and thus treating it as exogenous may lead to biased estimates. So, we
treat the temporally lagged dependent variable as endogenous and include the second lag in the
instrument set. The lagged dependent variable is strongly signicant, as might be expected,
given only periodic changes in the nominal rate. Second, we correct (refer to Table 4) for
potential serial correlation, at a following subsection, by using the Prais-Winsten estimation
method.
Add here Table 1: Basic and Augmented specications
A number of interesting observations can be made from results in Table 2. A rst
observation is that EU and Euro have di¤erent e¤ects on corporate taxes. As shown by the
corresponding estimates in models (2) to (9) the adoption of Euro has a negative and signicant
coe¢ cient while the entrance in EU has a positive and signicant impact in both dened groups
of EU (17 and 27 countries). Moreover, even though it is di¢ cult to discuss the exact direction
and magnitude of the net e¤ect from the entrance in the EU and the adoption of Euro currency,
it seems that the latter generates higher elasticity responses than the former.
Recall from our theoretical discussion that the adoption of a common currency decreases
the level of exchange rate uncertainty, and thereby leads to lower transaction costs and user-
costs of capital. Consequently, it leads to more intense competition for capital. In addition,
if entering a monetary union leads to a decrease in the levels of public debt, then adoption of
a common currency will lead to lower net real interest rate and user-costs of capital. Thus,
monetary integration can lead (via the user-cost-e¤ect) to lower capital taxes. The above
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empirical results regarding the impact of the adoption of Euro on corporate taxes suggest,
indeed, that these two e¤ects of monetary integration seem to dominate the e¤ects of lower
ination and seignorage sharing discussed in our theoretical analysis.
Recall also from our theoretical discussion that entering the European Union may lead
to more attractive investment conditions. These conditions may have to do with improved
institutional quality and legislative framework, improved technological know-how e.t.c. In
terms of our model, these could be captured by an increase in output-augmenting technologies.
Consequently, entering the European Union can lead (via- the technology e¤ect) to higher
capital taxes. In addition, entering an economic union entails the abolition of tari¤s. This, in
turn, leads to higher user-costs of capital and (via the user-cost-e¤ect) to higher capital taxes.
The above empirical results regarding the impact of entering the EU suggest, then, that these
two e¤ects of economic integration seem to dominate the determination of corporate taxes
when entering EU.
Notice that the e¤ects of EU entry and Euro adoption exist parallel to the presence
of strategic interaction in corporate tax setting among EU members. Comparing Model 1
with Models 2-6, we can see the implications of economic neighboring e¤ects for the impact
of European integration for EU17. Clearly, ignoring the economic neighboring e¤ects leads to
an underestimation of the aforementioned impact; a result that emphasizes the contribution
of our work by taking explicit account of economic neighboring e¤ects. Interestingly, also, the
impact of European integration will be di¤erentiated among the European countries. Countries
with dissimilar socio-economic characteristics have di¤erent tax responses (see models 2 and
3). Therefore, the impact of countries with similar features (spatial and economic neighboring
e¤ects35) corrects for any type of bias of the estimated results shown in Table 1.
Finally, it is worth drawing attention to the impact on the relevant estimates of the
expansion of the Union (Models 7-9). Clearly, the impact of EU expansion corrects for any
type of bias of the estimated results shown in Models 1-3 of Table 2. In fact, the signicant
coe¢ cients of Euro and EU dummies for any categorization of GDP values highlight the fact
that potential adoption of a common currency (or, a membership in the Union) do have a
signicant impact on the levels of corporate taxes.
35We included in the estimated model all the corresponding temporally lagged spatial and economic formula-
tions of the dependent variable but they are insignicant and do not alter the presented results.
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The direct e¤ect of the European Union has not been clearly identied in the literature.
Most of the papers (Altshuler and Goodspeed, 2006; and Deveraux et al, 2007a) capture also
the benet of the membership in the European Union by presenting country dummies. The
advantage of our work over the existing literature is that we account directly for the integrated
geo-economic environment. The latter treatment is more informative given that we study a
broader group of countries and we consider the impact of the expansion perspective of the
union.
7.2 EU corporate taxation: spatial and economic dimensions
The geographical location and the concentration of economic activities, such as the existence
of a core-periphery model, may lead to di¤erent optimal levels of taxation between regions
(Kind et al., 2000; Baldwin and Krugman, 2004). In addition, di¤erences in capital intensity of
production may lead to specialized trade between the members of a union (Wilson, 1987) and
thereby to di¤erent equilibrium levels of taxation. These are only some important determinants
of non-cooperative capital taxes. Zodrow (2003) sought to assess which of the features of tax
competition models t best to the European Union and underlined that the basic di¢ culty is
to assess the combined e¤ects of these features.
The strategic interaction between countries has been the subject of recent literature.
However, in this literature, the impact of economic and monetary integration and/or economic
neighboring e¤ects have not been accounted for. Here, by controlling for European integration,
we nd that both spatial and economic neighboring taxes a¤ect the level of corporate taxation
in European countries (see the corresponding coe¢ cients of models 1 to 9 in Table 2). Spatial
neighboring e¤ects range for EU 17 from 0.19 to 0.76 (Models 1 to 6) and economic neighboring
e¤ects range from 0.51 to 0.87 (Models 1 to 6). These estimates suggest the presence of a race-
to-bottom e¤ect.
Gérard (2005) shows that the location decision of multinationals, as well as the choice
between a foreign subsidiary and a foreign permanent establishment will severely impact on the
total tax burden. However, his analysis, which is not based on a spatial econometric framework,
faces the risk of underestimating the bias originated from spatial heterogeneity. The reason is,
as it is well known from the economic literature, that taxes a¤ect business location decisions.
Spatial interactions have been the focus of a number of recent papers. Besley et al. (2001)
use tax reaction functions for ve di¤erent taxes in the OECD between 1965 and 1997, nding
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interdependence in tax setting; a result in line with this paper. Karkalakos and Kotsogiannis
(2007), explored provincial tax reaction functions for Canada and found positive neighboring
spatial tax impacts at the level of provincial corporate setting; a result similar to the one
presented in this analysis. Finally, Devereux, Lockwood and Redoano (2007a) and Redoano
(2004) nd similar to our evidence of strategic interaction in corporate tax setting for the
OECD between 1992 and 2002 and for the EU-25 from 1980 to 1995 respectively.36 However,
our results are in contrast to the ndings of Stewart and Webb (2006) who look at the evolution
of corporate tax burdens - measured as corporate tax collected on GDP and on total taxes 
in the OECD countries between 1950 and 1999. They nd no evidence of a race-to the-bottom
e¤ect. A potential explanation for the presented di¤erences in magnitude and/or sign with
the above works is the absence from their analysis of the impact of neighboring economic
e¤ects. In fact, the inclusion of economic weights contributes from a di¤erent perspective to
the explanation of the existed spatial autocorrelation of capital taxes (compare Model 1 with
Models 2-6 in Table 2).
The expansion of EU (Models 7, 8 and 9) results in higher spatial neighboring impact
(0.74) and lower economic neighboring impact (0.16) for countries with high GDP values com-
paring to the initial group of EU (17 countries). A higher spatial impact in Model 8 denotes
that neighboring countries with high GDP values play a more important role after the expan-
sion than before it. The latter result is a signicant contribution of this paper. Moreover,
economic closeness (neighboring e¤ect) implies a lower impact at the setting of corporate taxes
for the EU of 27 than the EU of 17 countries. Interestingly, spatial estimates for neighboring
countries with low GDP values do not a¤ect the level of corporate taxes (Model 10 Table 2).
The signicant estimates of openness and neighboring economic weights indicate that as the
union expands more corporations are located in EU given the attractiveness of a large unied
market.
Add here Table 2. Spatial and Economic Criteria (Neighboring taxes)
36Redoano (2004), using panel data from 1980 to 1995, found interdependency among EU members regarding
both tax rates and government expenditures.
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7.3 EU corporate taxation: other determinants
Ination and population e¤ects have a positive impact on corporate taxes (Table 2). A possible
reason for these, after recalling our discussion of the theoretical model, is that an increase in
these variables leads to higher relative demand for public good.
Debt has also a positive impact on capital taxes. Possible reason for this is the associated
negative e¤ect of public debt on capital supply. Note also that unemployment and wage have
no impact at the capital tax rate competition in European Union.37
Furthermore, openness has an insignicant impact on capital taxes for EU17. This is
not in line with the ndings of Slemrod (2004) of a negative association between measures of
openness and statutory rates. However, Altshuler and Goodspeed T. (2006) nd that European
countries have become over time less intensely competitive among themselves; a concluding
argument that supports our ndings. Our result in question is also consistent with the models
of tax setting along the lines developed by Besley and Rosen (1998) and Devereux, Lockwood
and Redoano (2007 a,b). Notice, however, that enlargement of the euro-zone implies a positive
and signicant link between openness and capital taxes.
Finally, market capitalization refers to the number of listed companies (as a % of GDP) in
the economy. Note that the corresponding elasticity ranges from -0.03 (for high GDP countries)
to -0.17 (for similar degree of market capitalization countries) for EU 17 (Models 1 to 6),
where the expansion of EU resulted at a smaller spread from -0.04 to -0.12 (Models 7 to 9).
Therefore, the higher the number of the listed companies, the lower the corporate tax rates are.
One could argue that market capitalization can be thought of as a measure of capital-intensity
of production. If one takes this view, then the above result can be thought of echoing the
theoretical result in Wilson (1987).
7.4 Robustness
Beside the inverse distance-based criterion we used a number of alternative spatial weight
specications to examine the robustness of results. Actually, we employed k-neighbors criteria
(with k = 6 or k = 8), and specic distance zone criteria (with d = 300 km or d = 1000 km)
as suggested by Bottazzi and Peri (2003). The results do not vary signicantly. Moreover, the
F test in the rst stage of the estimation tests the null hypothesis of whether the instruments
37Due to space limitation the relevant estimations are omitted from Table 2.
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are not correlated with the endogenous variables. Given the outcome of Table 2, we reject the
null hypothesis of no correlation.
Furthermore, Table 3 presents alternative models to examine the robustness of the re-
sults. The degree of di¤erentiation refers to the inclusion of interaction terms to the models
described in Table 2. We use a number of interaction components (i.e., ination*euro and
openness*euro) to control for scal or market e¤ects. It has been well established (Revelli,
2005) that the intuition behind conditional hypotheses is captured quite well by multiplicative
interaction models. Interestingly, the coe¢ cients of ination*euro and Openness*euro are sig-
nicant only for high GDP values (1st and 8th model, Table 3). This is a signicant nding of
this analysis, due to the fact that previous studies do not take into account economic neigh-
boring e¤ects. Moreover, note that the EU dummy remains signicant, after using most of
the economic criteria. Countries with high GDP values decrease (by 0.05%) the corporate tax
rates should ination is increased and additionally we control for the adoption of Euro. Ad-
ditionally, countries with high GDP values increase (by 1.59%) the corporate tax rates should
the degree of openness is increased and additionally we control for the adoption of Euro. Those
are the countries that are mostly beneted since they represent the major trading countries
in the union. The pattern of the remaining coe¢ cients remains similar to the one at Table 2.
Finally, the expanded version of the Union (EU 27) follows a similar pattern of results with the
initial specication presented at Table 2. It is clear that economic weights drive the existence
of neighboring impact and they are originated from the initial group of EU members.
Add here Table 3: Robustness check
7.5 Temporal and spatial dependence
In this section of the paper, the errors are also assumed to display serial correlation, and
therefore the Prais-Winsten estimation is used with PCSE (PW-PCSE). And since T is larger
than N, although not substantially larger, the FGLS estimates are also reported in Table 4.
Economic weights are dened based on the GDP criterion and market capitalization, where
spatial weights are based on the inverse distance criterion. For this study, with 17 countries
and 30 time periods, the bias is anticipated to be considerably smaller than for the typical
panel data with a large number of cross sections and usually less than 10 time periods. So, the
FGLS and PW-PCSE estimates may still perform reasonably well here in the presence of the
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lagged dependant variable.
It is well known that generally, strategic interaction can be generated by either tax
competition or yardstick competition (Besley and Smart, 2003). The consistent performance
of neighboring spatial and economic weights suggests that tax competition is at work. Allowing
for serial correlations at the errors we examine the signicance of yardstick competition in our
model. Table 4 veries the robustness of our results towards that direction, since most of the
presented estimates have great similarities with the one at Table 2. Models 1 and 2 do not take
into account temporally lagged corporate taxes but Models 3 and 4 include them. Models 1 to
4 use economic weights based on GDP similarity index, where Models 5 and 6 dene economic
weights based on market capitalization similarity index.
Add here Table 4. Temporal dependence
8 Concluding Remarks
There are a number of theoretical reasons why corporate taxes may depend on the corporate
taxes in proximate countries on both geographic and economic grounds. Such spatial and
economic interdependences have been largely ignored by the empirical literature with only a
couple recent papers accounting for such issues in their estimation. This paper conducts a
more general examination of spatial and economic interactions in empirical tax models using
data from the European Union.
We nd that estimated relationships of traditional determinants of corporate tax setting
are robust to inclusion of terms that capture spatial and economic interdependences for the
EU17. Moreover, we nd that the estimated spatial and economic interdependences are quite
sensitive to the sample of countries one examines. In particular, the geographic scope of the
sample is quite important in trying to separate evidence supporting di¤erent motivations for
equilibrium tax levels. The expansion of EU (EU27) results at a lower impact of spatial
determinants, while emphasizing the impact of economic one.
Omitted variable bias from not modeling spatial and economic interdependence is ap-
parently quite signicant in these cross-country corporate-tax estimations across the variety of
EU denitions we explore. This point is particularly applicable to the few previous studies of
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spatial e¤ects in empirical corporate tax patterns, as ours is the rst to include both spatial
and economic e¤ects, and control explicitly for the e¤ects of both economic and monetary
integration in Europe.
Furthermore, our results highlight that economic and monetary integration have a sig-
nicant impact on corporate taxes in Europe. The estimates of monetary (Euro dummy) and
political (EU dummy) determinants of corporate taxes are in fact very robust to changing the
sample of EU countries. Specically, we nd that economic integration has lead to higher
taxes, while monetary integration has lead to lower taxes. Our theoretical model suggests that
these a¤ects could mainly be due to the associated (a) increase in the average technological
quality and decrease in public indebtedness and (b) the e¤ects on the user-costs of capital of
lower transaction costs and tari¤s. Importantly, our theoretical and empirical results indicate
that the recent movements in capital taxes in EU could be attributed to the introduction of
the Euro. As capital movements have further been enhanced and a unied monetary base has
been introduced, through euro currency, more countries have been engaged in tax competition.
This intensied competition seems to be a major determinant of the reduction in average tax
rates over the period and the country samples considered.
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10 Appendix A
By iterating forward the consumers budget constraint and using the transversality condition
limv!1
(Bjt+1+v+Mjt+1+v)
vz=1(1+t+z)
= 0 we derive the consumers intertemporal budget constraint
1X
v=0
(1 + jt+v)C
i
jt+v + (jt+v + t+v)M
i
jt+v
vz=1(1 + t+z)
=
(1 + t)(M
i
jt +B
i
jt) +
1X
v=0
ijt+v(1 + jt+v)Ajt+vj [rjt+v]
vz=1(1 + t+z)
;
where vz=1(1+t+z)  (1+t+1):::(1+t+v) is the compounded real rate of return to savings,
with the convention that 0z=1(1 + t+z)  1:
Period t consumption and real money balances are then part of the solution of the
system of the consumers intertemporal budget constraint and, for any v = 0; :::;1; of the rst
order conditions (f.o.c.s) with respect to Bijt+v+1 and M
i
jt+v+1: After some straightforward
manipulations, the latter can be written as:
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j
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jt+v+2];
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U ijM [C
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=
(1 + jt+v)(1 + ijt+v+1)
ijt+v+1
,
where ijt+v+1 =
1+t+v+1
1 jt+v+1   1 is the nominal interest rate in country j
So, from the f.o.c. with respect to M ijt+v+1; money holdings are such that the marginal
rate of substitution between real money and consumption equals the relative price between
consumption and real money.38 Assuming that
U ijC [C
i
jt+v ;M
i
jt+v+1]
U ijM [C
i
jt+v ;M
i
jt+v+1]
is strictly increasing with
M ijt+v+1; we have that the latter is decreasing with the nominal interest rate. Assuming also
that
U ijC [C
i
jt+v ;M
i
jt+v+1]
U ijM [C
i
jt+v ;M
i
jt+v+1]
is strictly decreasing with Cijt+v; we have that real money balances
increase with consumption. Let ~M ij [C
i
jt+v;
ijt+v+1
(1+jt+v)(1+ijt+v+1)
] be the resulting demand for
money in period t + v, as an increasing function of consumption and a decreasing function of
the relative price of money.
Using the money demand function ~M ij [:] in the f.o.c. with respect to B
i
jt+v+1 we have
U ijC [C
i
jt+v;
~M ij [C
i
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ijt+v+1
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jt+v)(1 + ijt+v+1)
]] =
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]]:
38Note from the intertemporal budget constraint, that
t+v+1+t+v+1
1+t+v+1
=
it+v+1
1+it+v+1
can be thought of as the
price of real money holdings, Mt+v+1; relative to consumption Ct+v:
37
Backward iteration of this implies that, for any v = 1; :::;1; Cijt+v is given by a function
~Cij [C
i
jt; 1+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;
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; vj
v
z=1(1+t+z)]; which is implicitly determined by
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@C we have that
~Cij [C
i
jt; ] is strictly increasing
with Cijt: Thus, if C
i
jt is a normal good, so is C
i
jt+1 for any v = 1; :::;1: Therefore, we also
have that ~Cij [] is strictly increasing with vjvz=1(1 + t+j):
~Cij []; ~M ij [] and the intertemporal budget constraint give, after recalling the den-
ition of the nominal interest rate, demands for consumption and real money balances in
any period t; t + 1; ::;1; as a function of all prices, policies and technological parameters
from period t and onwards, and as a function of period-t   1 bonds and money holdings,
Bijt and M
i
jt. As part of this solution, we clearly have demand functions for period t :
Cijt[t; rjt; xjt; s
i
jt; Ajt] and M
i
jt+1[t; rjt; xjt; s
i
jt; Ajt]; as described in Section 2. In fact, note
that, given the above assumptions, an increase in period-t intertemporal income, (1+t)(M
i
jt+
Bijt) +
P1
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ijt+v(1+jt+v)Ajt+vj [rjt+v ]
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; will increase, all other things equal, Cijt and thereby
Cijt+v and M
i
jt+v for any v = 1; :::;1:
Demand for real bonds in period t; Bijt+1[t; rjt; xjt; s
i
jt; Ajt], in turn, is given by utilizing
the period-t private budget constraint:
Bijt+1[t; rjt; xjt; s
i
jt; Ajt; jt] =
(1 + t)B
i
jt + (1  jt)M ijt
+ijt(1 + jt)Ajtj [rjt]
 M ijt+1[t; rjt; xjt; sijt; Ajt]  (1 + jt)Cijt[t; rjt; xjt; sijt; Ajt]:
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Let, after suppressing the obvious dependence on Ajt+1; jt+1; ajt+1 and ft+2; t+3; :::g;
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W^jt+1[Qt+1; t+1; s
1
jt+1; :::; s
Nj
jt+1; jt+1] 
max
;x;d
X
i
V ijt+1[t+1; rjt+1; x; s
i
jt+1; Ajt+1]H
i
j [Gjt+1] + 
i
jWjt+2[Qt+2; t+2]g
subject to Qjt+2 = Qjt+2[Qjt+1; rjt+1; x; d; t+1]; for any j
Gjt+1 = Kj [rjt+1] + d  (1 + t+1)Djt+1
+ajt+1(Mjt+2   (1  )Mjt+1) + jt+1
+
X
i
Cijt+1[t+1; rjt+1; x; s
i
jt+1; Ajt+1]
 (Ajt+1Fj [Kj [rjt+1]] + (1  jt+1)Kj [rjt+1]);
 = t+1 under monetary union; and
Mjt+2 
NjX
i=1
M ijt+2[t+1; rjt+1; x; s
i
jt+1; Ajt+1];
rjt+1 
t+1 + jt+1 + jt+1 +    (1  jt+1)
Ajt+1(1 + )
:
Note, after recalling also the denition of sijt+1; that from the system of the above opti-
misation problem for every country one derives the MPE strategies of every country j; for
(a) capital taxes, denoted by ~Tjt+1[Qt+1; t+1]; (b) import taxes and ination rate, denoted
and summarized by ~xjt+1[Qt+1; t+1], and (c) received share of foreign seignorage, denoted by
jt+1[Qt+1; t+1], (d) public good; denoted by Gjt+1[Qt+1; t+1]; and (e) user-cost of capital,
denoted by ~rjt+1[Qt+1; t+1]]:
Note that Wjt+1[Qt+1; t+1] = W^jt+1[Qjt+1; t+1; s
1
jt+1; :::; s
Nj
jt+1; jt+1[Qt+1; t+1]]:
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In the f.o.c.,
jt  1
Kj [rjt]Ajt(1 + jt)
PNj
i=1 
i
jtU
i
jC [C
i
jt;M
i
jt+1]H
i
j [Gjt]

f
NjX
i=1
X
ijt+12fM ijt+1;Bijt+1g
ij@Wjt+1[Qt+1; t+1]
@ijt+1
@ijt+1[Qjt; rjt; xjt; djt; t]
@rjt
g:
This is a measure of the marginal e¤ect of the capital tax on future welfare relative to current
national capital.
In addition,
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Rjt  1
Kj [rjt]Ajt(1 + jt)
fajt
NjX
i=1
@M ijt+1[]
@rjt
+jt
NjX
i=1
@Cijt[]
@rjt
 jt(Ajtrjt + (1  jt))K 0j [rjt]g:
Moreover,
jt 
PNj
i=1 U
i
j [C
i
jt;M
i
jt+1]H
i0
j [Gjt]PNj
i=1 
i
jtU
i
jC [C
i
jt;M
i
jt+1]H
i
j [Gjt]
> 0:
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Consider rst the total di¤erential Rjt for given capital tax. We have
KjtAjt(1 + jt)dRjt =
 fRjtK 0jtAjt(1 + jt) 
NjX
i=1
(jt
@2Cijt[]
@r2jt
+ ajt
@2M ijt+1[]
@r2jt
)
+jt(AjtK
0
jt + (Ajtrjt + (1  jt))K 00jt)gdrjt
+f
NjX
i=1
@Cijt[]
@rjt
+
NjX
i=1
(jt
@2Cijt[]
@rjt@jt
+ ajt
@2M ijt+1[]
@rjt@jt
)
 (Ajtrjt + (1  jt))K 0jt  AjtKjtRjtgdjt
+f jtrjtK 0jt +
NjX
i=1
(jt
@2Cijt[]
@rjt@Ajt
+ ajt
@2M ijt+1[]
@rjt@Ajt
) KjtRjt(1 + jt)gdAjt
+
X
jt2fjt;jtg
X
i
(jt
@2Cijt[]
@rjt@jt
+ ajt
@2M ijt+1[]
@rjt@jt
)djt (10)
+
NjX
i=1
X
ijt2fM ijt;Bijtg
(jt
@2Cijt[]
@rjt@ijt
+
ajt
Kjt
@2M ijt+1[]
@rjt@ijt
)dijt
+
NjX
i=1
@M ijt+1[]
@rjt
dajt
The rst term above captures the fact that the capital-tax-induced net increase in rev-
enues from import taxes and seignorage, Rjt; depends on the user-cost of capital, rjt, in two
ways. The rst is due to the fact that Rjt is expressed as a proportion of the current capital.
Since the latter is decreasing with the capitals user-cost, we have that an increase in the latter
leads to an increase in Rjt, all other things equal. Second, the user-cost of capital a¤ects the
capital-tax-induced change in seignorage and tari¤ revenues. This e¤ect is ambiguous.
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For given capitals user-cost, Rjt is a¤ected by a change in the tari¤, jt, in four ways.
This is captured in the second term above. First, an increase in the tari¤ raises the capital-tax-
induced decrease in tari¤ revenues that follows from the negative e¤ect of the capital tax on
consumption. This pushes to a lower Rjt, all other things equal. Second, an increase in the tari¤
a¤ects the price of consumption and hence the capital-tax-induced decrease in money holdings
and consumption. The former, in turn, a¤ects seignorage, while the latter a¤ects revenues from
import taxes. This e¤ect is ambiguous and it depends on the specics of consumersutility.
Third, an increase in the tari¤ increases the capital-tax-induced increase in tari¤ revenues that
follows from the negative e¤ect of the capital tax on production. Fourth, an increase in the
tari¤ reduces the positive impact of the capital tax on the user-cost of capital, and thereby the
capital-tax-induced net increase in the revenues from seignorage and import taxes. This e¤ect
has the opposite sign of Rjt; which, recall, is ambiguous.
For given capitals user-cost, Rjt is a¤ected by a change in the output-augmenting tech-
nology, Ajt, in three ways. This is captured in the third term above. First, an increase in
the technology raises the capital-tax-induced increase in tari¤ revenues that follows from the
negative e¤ect of the capital tax on production. This pushes to a higher Rjt, all other things
equal. Second, an increase in technology a¤ects positively the income from the xed factor
and hence the capital-tax-induced change in money holdings and consumption. As in the case
of the tari¤, these a¤ect the revenues from seignorage and import taxes. This e¤ect is also
ambiguous and it depends on the particulars of consumersutility. Third, an improvement
in technology reduces the positive impact of the capital tax on the user-cost of capital, and
thereby the capital-tax-induced net increase in the revenues from seignorage and import taxes.
This e¤ect has the opposite sign of Rjt; which is ambiguous.
For given capitals user-cost, Rjt depends also on the net real interest rate, jt. Speci-
cally, an increase in the net real interest rate a¤ects positively the returns to past bond holdings,
and hence the capital-tax-induced change in money holdings and consumption. This has an
ambiguous e¤ect on Rjt: Similarly, for ination, jt; and pre-determined money,M ijt; and bond
holdings, Bijt: These are captured by the fourth and fth terms above.
Finally, we have that Rjt depends on the seignorage share ajt: This is captured by the
sixth term above: Under normality, this e¤ect is negative. The reason is that a higher share
leads to a higher capital-tax-induced decrease in demand for money and hence seignorage.
We turn to the public-good valuation jt: Totally di¤erentiating for given capital tax
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leads to
djt =
@jt
@Gjt
dGjt +
NjX
i=1
@jt
@Cijt
dCijt +
NjX
i=1
@jt
@M ijt
dM ijt: (11)
After noting that @jt@Gjt < 0; we have that an increase in public good provision leads to a lower
valuation for public good. Similarly, due to @jt
@Cijt
> 0, an increase in consumption leads to a
higher valuation for public good. However, note that the sign of @jt
@M ijt
cannot be ensured unless
further restrictions are imposed on preferences.
Of course, public good provision, consumption and money holdings are themselves func-
tions of the user-cost of capital, the tax on imports, technology, transaction costs and other im-
portant determinants. To gain further understanding note, after totally di¤erentiating the gov-
ernments budget constraint for given capital tax, and using
P
iC
i
jt = Cjt and
P
iM
i
jt =Mjt;
that
dGjt = ajt
NjX
i=1
dM ijt+1 + jt
NjX
i=1
dCijt
+fK 0jt   jt(Ajtrjt + (1  jt))K 0jtgdrjt
+f
X
i
Cijt   Yjtgdjt
 jtF [Kjt]dAjt (12)
+f
X
i
(M ijt+1   (1  jt)M ijt)gdajt + djt
 ajt(1  jt)dMjt + ajtMjtdjt
+dDt+1   (1 + t)dDjt  Djtdt:
Thus, all other things equal, an increase in demand for money and/or consumption increases
the public good. These are captured by the rst two terms, respectively. An increase in past
holdings of money, outstanding debt and the net real interest rate reduce current public good
provision. These are captured by the eleventh and twelfth terms above, respectively. On the
other hand, an increase in ination and in issued public debt raise public good provision - see
the ninth and tenth terms above, respectively.
Furthermore, we have that an increase in the capitals user-cost, rjt, has three e¤ects on
public good provision. This is captured by the third term above. The rst e¤ect is negative,
and arises from the fact that a higher user-cost of capital leads to lower capital and thereby
revenues from capital, for given taxes. The second e¤ect is positive, and arises from the negative
e¤ect of lower capital on output, and the positive thereby e¤ect on imports and hence tari¤
revenues.
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An increase in the tari¤, jt, leads unambiguously to higher (resp. lower) public revenues
for an importing (resp. exporting) country. This is captured by the fourth term above.
An improvement in output-augmenting technology, Ajt, has a negative e¤ect on public
revenues, captured by the fth term above. It arises from the positive e¤ect of better technology
on output, and the negative thereby e¤ect on imports and hence tari¤ revenues.
The sixth and seventh terms above capture, respectively, the e¤ects on public revenues of
a change in the seignorage share, ajt, and the transfer of foreign seignorage, jt. These e¤ects
are important for a country that enters a monetary union. Clearly, the net revenue e¤ect is
ambiguous. A decrease in the seignorage share ajt lowers revenues from national seignorage,
while an increase in the appropriated foreign seignorage raises revenues, and hence public good
provision.
We now turn to consumption and demand for real money balances, which inuence public
revenues and the public good valuation jt; and hence the public-good-valuation e¤ect. After
using the optimal consumption functions, we have that
dCijt =
@Cijt[]
@jt
djt +
@Cijt[]
@rjt
drjt +
@Cijt[]
@Ajt
dAjt
+
@Cijt[]
@t
dt +
@Cijt[]
@t
dt +
@Cijt[]
@M ijt
dM ijt +
@Cijt[]
@Bijt
dBijt; (13)
and, similarly, from the optimal money demand functions,
dM ijt+1 =
@M ijt+1[]
@jt
djt +
@M ijt+1[]
@rjt
drjt +
@M ijt+1[]
@Ajt
dAjt
+
@M ijt+1[]
@t
dt +
@M ijt+1[]
@t
dt +
@M ijt+1[]
@M ijt
dM ijt +
@M ijt+1[]
@Bijt
dBijt: (14)
We have that a decrease in current ination, or an increase past holdings of bonds and money
or in the current net interest rate raises current income from past savings. Moreover, an
improvement in technology or a reduction in the user-cost of capital increase rents. All these
changes lead to higher income and hence, by normality, to higher consumption and demand
for real money. These are captured, respectively, by the fth, seventh, sixth, fourth, third
and second terms in the above equations, where
@Cijt[]
@jt
> 0 and
@M ijt+1[]
@jt
> 0 for jt 2
fAjt;M ijt; Bijt; tg; while
@Cijt[]
@jt
< 0 and
@M ijt+1[]
@jt
< 0 for jt 2 frjt; jtg. Furthermore,
we have that the e¤ects of an increase in the tari¤ on consumption and money demand are
ambiguous. The reason is that a higher tari¤ increases the price of consumption, while it
increases the income from the xed factor.
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Let us now turn to the dependence of the capitals user-cost on transaction costs, the
tari¤, technology, and net real interest rate. We have, for given capital tax, from (2) that
drjt =
1
Ajt(1 + jt)
fdjt   (rjtAjt + 1  jt)djt   rjt(1 + jt)dAjt + dtg (15)
Thus, a higher net real interest rate and/or transaction cots will increase the user-cost of
capital, while a higher tari¤ and/or an improvement in technology will lead to a lower user-
cost of capital.
Notice now that for many of the above determinants of capital taxes, changes in the net
real interest rate are important. Given that the net real interest rate is itself endogenously
determined in equilibrium, we turn to its total di¤erential, for given domestic (i.e. country-j)
capital tax. By making use of the capital-market-clearing condition (3) and the denition of
the capitals user-cost (2), we have
(
JX
v=1
K 0vt
Avt(1 + vt)
)dt = d Kt  
JX
v=1
K 0vt
Avt(1 + vt)
dvt
+
JX
v=1
K 0vt
Avt(1 + vt)
((rvtAvt + 1  vt)dvt + rvt(1 + vt)dAvt) (16)
 
JX
v=1
v 6=j
K 0vt
Avt(1 + vt)
d vt:
Thus, higher supply of capital, Kt, lead to a lower net real interest rate. Also, lower transaction
costs, higher tari¤s and improvements in technology across regions increase regional demands
for capital, and hence lead to a higher net real interest rate. Furthermore, higher foreign capital
taxes lead to lower demand for capital abroad and thereby a decrease in the net real interest
rate. It should be emphasized here that foreign capital taxes, tari¤s, capital transaction costs,
output-augmenting technologies and supplies of capital a¤ect the user-costs of capital across
regions through their impact on the common net real interest rate. In fact, combining (15) and
(16) we have
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Ajt(1 + jt)drjt =
1PJ
v=1
K0vt
Avt(1+vt)
d Kt
+(1  kjt)djt
 (rjtAjt + 1  jt)(1  kjt)djt (17)
 rjt(1 + jt)(1  kjt)dAjt
+
JX
v=1
v 6=j
kvt((rvtAvt + 1  vt)dvt + rvt(1 + vt)dAvt   dvt   d vt);
where kjt 
K0jt
Ajt(1+jt)PJ
v=1
K0vt
Avt(1+vt)
2 (0; 1): The last term in the above equation represents the spillover
e¤ects, which are preset in our set-up through the common net real interest rate. Clearly, due
to kjt < 1; the net e¤ect on the domestic capitals user-cost of a change in the domestic tari¤,
or capital transaction cost or technology follows the corresponding direct e¤ect. In other words,
the e¤ect on the user-cost of capital through the net real interest rate is not the dominant one.
Collecting terms from (6), (10)(14), (16) and (17) gives us the dependence of capital
taxes on transaction costs, output-augmenting technology, tari¤s, seignorage shares, foreign
transfers of seignorage, public debt policy, ination, and pre-determined holdings of money
and private and public bonds.39 ;40
39jt (recall its denition in Appendix C) depends on the future net real interest rates. It also depends on
future ination, user-costs of capital, money holdings, future public good provision and future taxes, transaction
costs and output-augmenting technologies. How do these depend on the period-t tari¤s, output-augmenting
technologies and other important determinants is ambiguous without further restrictions on preferences and
various parameters. Investigating these e¤ects is out of the scope of the current work, and therefore are not
discussed further.
40Of course, rjt;Rjt;jt and jt depend also on the capital tax. Note, however, after assuming that the
second order conditions are satised, that Ejt is strictly decreasing with  jt: Hence, the e¤ect of a policy or a
parameter on the equilibrium capital tax has the sign of the net e¤ect of the policy or parameter in question on
Ejt: Therefore, collecting terms as stated in the text above is valid for the understanding of the determination
of the equilibrium capital tax.
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Table A1 
Summary Statistics for European Union* (17 members; 1975-2005). 
 
Variable Description Mean Min Max Source 
τit Highest marginal tax 
rate, corporate rate  
 
0.431 0.09 0.689 KPMG, Corporate 
Tax Rate Survey, 
Switzerland. 
Agriculture, 
value added  
Agriculture, value added   
(% of GDP) 
0.039 0.011 0.431 World Development 
Indicators (Edition: 
September 2006). 
GDP GDP values** 4241.71 1104.2 8.175 World Development 
Indicators (Edition: 
September 2006). 
Debt Total debt, as a 
proportion of GDP 
119.00 85.08 137.43 European 
Commission, 2006. 
Inflation The yearly percentage 
change in the consumer 
price index  
0.087 -0.061 0.2721 OECD Economic 
Outlook. 
openness The sum of exports and 
imports divided by 
1.000.000*GDP and 
lagged one year   
 
  0.032 
 
-0.276 
 
 
0.495 
 
 
OECD Economic 
Outlook. 
Market 
capitalization 
Market capitalization 
of listed companies (% 
of GDP) 
0.384 0.091 0.688 World Development 
Indicators (Edition: 
September 2006). 
Population Population, total**. 20,271 7,003 82,095 European 
Commission, 2006. 
Unemployment Unemployment, total 
(% of total labor force) 
 
0.077 0.029 0.155 OECD Economic 
Outlook. 
Wages 
 
 
Workers' remittances and 
compensation of 
employees***. 
34,567 10,250 85,069 World Development 
Indicators (Edition: 
September 2006). 
Euro Dummy = 1 if the 
country has adopted 
euro currency and 0 
otherwise. 
   European 
Commission, 2006. 
Eu Dummy = 1 if the 
country is a member of 
the European Union and 
0 otherwise. 
   European 
Commission, 2006. 
*European Union of 17 members refers to the case before the expansion of EU in 2004 and  
includes Switzerland and Norway. 
** The variable is multiplied by 10
3
 when it is used in the regression analysis. 
*** The variable is multiplied by 10
5
 when it is used in the regression analysis. 
2 
 
 
Figure 1: Taxes as a % of GDP in EU 
 
               Note: Eurostat changed its classification in 1995. The source of the graph is 
European Commission (2006). 
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Table 1: Basic and Augmented specifications 
 
 
 
 
Notes: T-statistics are given in parentheses. Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity, and are 
clustered by year to allow for spatial correlation in the errors. Also, *, **, and ***, respectively, 
indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Model 
Specification 
Dependent Variable: 
Marginal tax rate, corporate rate (%) 
  
(1) (2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
FE 
(5) 
RE 
(6) 
FE 
(7) 
RE 
constant 108.12* 
(2.39) 
126.85* 
(2.49) 
123.61* 
(2.22) 
141.42* 
(2.41) 
-5.68 
(-1.03) 
189.57* 
(2.06) 
15.11 
(1.32) 
Lagged taxes 0.22 
(0.61) 
0.14 
(0.35) 
0.16 
(0.41) 
0.087 
(0.20) 
1.12* 
(2.80) 
0.47 
(2.37)* 
0.49 
(1.68) 
Agriculture, value 
added  
11.61* 
(2.26) 
12.71* 
(2.33) 
12.32* 
(2.11) 
13.38* 
(2.18) 
-0.57 
(-0.92) 
8.22* 
(2.78) 
2.42 
(1.54) 
Gdp -13.08* 
(-2.45) 
-14.62* 
(-2.57) 
-14.26* 
(-2.29) 
-15.74* 
(-2.40) 
0.52* 
(1.01) 
-6.88** 
(-3.49) 
-2.59* 
(-1.83) 
Debt 0.74* 
(2.12) 
0.71* 
(1.95) 
0.68* 
(2.03) 
0.65* 
(2.28) 
0.56* 
(2.01) 
0.66* 
(1.89) 
0.54* 
(1.92) 
Inflation 0.018 
(0.60) 
0.014 
(0.41) 
0.025 
(0.76) 
0.02 
(0.59) 
0.056* 
(2.39) 
-0.019 
(-0.62) 
0.06 
(2.49) 
openness 0.008 
(0.47) 
0.014 
(0.70) 
0.009 
(0.55) 
0.014 
(0.73) 
52.3 
(1.14) 
0.02 
(1.45) 
0.02 
(1.48) 
Euro  0.59 
(0.99) 
 0.52 
(0.84) 
-0.059 
(-0.09) 
1.05* 
(2.21) 
-2.71 
(-2.0) 
Eu   1.42* 
(1.79) 
1.49* 
(1.76) 
0.11 
(0.23) 
1.42* 
(2.62) 
0.92 
(1.68) 
Market capitalization       -0.02** 
(-3.89) 
-0.02 
(-0.82) 
Population      -15.05 
(-1.61) 
1.12* 
(2.0) 
unemployment      -0.02 
(-0.21) 
-0.07 
(-1.60) 
Wages 
 
Country Dummies   
 
 
No 
 
 
No 
 
 
No 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
Yes 
-0.19* 
(-2.23) 
Yes 
-0.16* 
(-1.87) 
Yes 
 
Rsquared 0.58 0.52 0.56 0.49 0.68 0.75 0.70 
Diagnostic tests        
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2. Spatial and Economic Criteria (Neighboring taxes) 
Spatial Criteria European Union: 17 members
# 
European Union: 27 members
## 
Model 
 
Economic Criteria 
(1) 
 
None 
       (2) 
  
 Gdp=high 
(3) 
  
Gdp=low 
(4) 
 
Market Cap/tion 
(5) 
 
Wages 
(6) 
 
Exports 
(7) 
 
None 
(8) 
 
Gdp=high 
(9) 
 
Gdp=low 
Constant 8.11* 
(1.92) 
12.12* 
(1.97) 
-16.15 
(-1.08) 
-11.42 
(-1.21) 
15.17* 
(2.23) 
10.38* 
(1.75) 
   5.11** 
(2.89) 
   9.17** 
(2.85) 
19.01 
(1.78) 
Spatial Neighboring 
taxes 
0.76* 
(1.95) 
0.26* 
(2.83) 
0.19* 
(1.93) 
  0.46** 
(2.88) 
0.54* 
(2.27) 
0.52* 
(2.01) 
0.93* 
(2.14) 
0.74* 
(2.03) 
0.05 
(0.78) 
Economic Neighboring 
taxes 
 0.87* 
(2.02) 
0.51* 
(1.82) 
0.16 
(1.27) 
0.25 
(1.21) 
0.37 
(1.45) 
   0.16* 
(1.87) 
0.65* 
(1.94) 
Lagged taxes 0.42* 
(1.71) 
0.67* 
(1.78) 
0.33* 
(1.83) 
0.54* 
(1.95) 
0.75* 
(1.99) 
0.62* 
(1.93) 
0.17* 
(1.92) 
0.08* 
(1.96) 
0.42* 
(1.85) 
Agriculture, value added  1.92* 
(1.79) 
2.86* 
(1.94) 
3.68** 
(2.91) 
1.89* 
(1.78) 
0.87 
(0.74) 
1.92* 
(2.14) 
1.79* 
(2.55) 
1.56* 
(2.04) 
2.61** 
(2.94) 
Gdp -2.56* 
(-1.99) 
-2.11* 
(-1.88) 
-1.54* 
(-2.03) 
-1.75* 
(-1.93) 
-1.38* 
(-2.09) 
-1.59* 
(-2.17) 
-2.86* 
(-1.91) 
-2.27* 
(-1.96) 
-1.87* 
(-2.11) 
Debt  0.47* 
(1.56) 
0.34* 
(1.88) 
  0.41** 
(3.16) 
0.38* 
(1.95) 
0.24* 
(1.74) 
0.28* 
(1.94) 
0.68* 
(2.37) 
0.32* 
(2.07) 
0.38* 
(2.01) 
Inflation 0.03* 
(1.83) 
0.11* 
(1.79) 
0.04 
(0.93) 
0.01* 
(1.75) 
0.01 
(1.68) 
0.09 
(1.04) 
0.09* 
(1.89) 
0.05* 
(1.85) 
0.07 
(1.95) 
Openness 0.01 
(0.07) 
0.04 
(1.02) 
0.08 
(1.21) 
0.09 
(1.22) 
0.12 
(0.55) 
0.07 
(0.36) 
0.28* 
(1.89) 
0.21* 
(1.77) 
0.14* 
(1.81) 
Euro -0.92* 
(-1.88) 
-1.75* 
(-2.32) 
-2.31* 
(-1.85) 
-1.55* 
(-1.72) 
-1.83* 
(-1.94) 
-2.06* 
(-2.03) 
   -1.74* 
(-1.79) 
   -1.35** 
(-2.47) 
-2.45* 
(-1.97) 
Eu 0.44* 
(1.91) 
0.53* 
(1.88) 
0.71* 
(2.03) 
0.58* 
(1.95) 
0.64* 
(2.07) 
0.71* 
(2.41) 
0.96* 
(1.88) 
0.84* 
(1.82) 
0.79* 
(2.09) 
Market capitalization -0.06* 
(-2.27) 
-0.03* 
(-2.15) 
-0.11* 
(-2.41) 
-0.17* 
(-1.95) 
-0.56 
(-0.95) 
-0.89 
(-0.88) 
-0.12* 
(-2.19) 
-0.09* 
(-2.11) 
-0.04* 
(-2.02) 
Population 1.01* 
(2.55) 
1.04* 
(2.22) 
0.31 
(0.96) 
0.45* 
(1.84) 
0.37* 
(1.93) 
0.18 
(0.81) 
0.58* 
(1.91) 
0.67* 
(1.84) 
0.11 
(0.27) 
Rsquared 0.61 0.68 0.65 0.67 0.68 0.70 0.68 0.77 0.67 
F-test 323.74 547.89 678.54 756.91 611.55 589.88 359.15 225.74 198.43 
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Notes:  
1. T-statistics are given in parentheses. Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity, and are clustered by year to allow for spatial correlation in the errors. Also, *, **, 
 and ***, respectively, indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels. 
2. Neighboring explanatory variables are used as instruments for both spatial and economic weights. 
3. European Union of 17 (#) members refers to the case before the expansion of EU in 2004 and includes Switzerland and Norway. European Union of 
27 (##) members refers to the case after the expansion of EU in 2004 and covers the period 1993-2005. 
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Table 3: Robustness check 
 
Spatial Criteria European Union: 
17 members
# 
 
European Union:  
27 members
##
 
 
Model 
 
Economic Criteria 
(1) 
 
Gdp=high 
(2) 
  
Gdp=low 
(3) 
Market 
capitalization 
(4) 
 
Wages 
(5) 
   
 Exports 
(6) 
 
Gdp=high 
(7) 
  
 Gdp=low 
Constant 53.88* 
(2.68) 
45.17* 
(1.75) 
59.85* 
(2.23) 
24.12* 
(1.88) 
18.65* 
(1.71) 
22.15 
(1.21) 
11.87 
(0.84) 
Spatial 
Neighboring taxes 
0.28* 
(2.11) 
0.35* 
(1.82) 
0.54* 
(2.41) 
0.61* 
(2.04) 
0.58* 
(1.92) 
0.86* 
(2.19) 
0.17 
(0.67) 
Economic 
Neighboring taxes 
0.71* 
(2.23) 
0.87* 
(2.45) 
0.37* 
(1.74) 
0.23 
(0.55) 
0.58* 
(1.75) 
0.37* 
(1.93) 
0.55* 
(2.38) 
Lagged taxes 0.61 * 
(1.71) 
0.83* 
(1.94) 
0.71*  
(2.21) 
0.49  
(1.05) 
0.42 
(1.69) 
0.89 * 
(1.86) 
0.59* 
(1.98) 
Agriculture, value 
added  
1.75* 
(2.48 ) 
1.97* 
(2.01 ) 
2.58* 
(1.76) 
2.11 
(1.45) 
1.58* 
(1.93) 
1.23* 
(2.01) 
2.35** 
(2.77 ) 
Gdp 
 
 
-1.46* 
(-2.41) 
 
-1.21* 
(-1.72) 
  
-1.79* 
(-2.02) 
 
-1.44* 
(-2.41) 
 
-1.17* 
(1.78) 
 
-1.09* 
(-1.83) 
 
-1.21* 
(-1.79) 
Debt 
 
0.52* 
(1.83) 
0.79* 
(2.34) 
0.67* 
(1.84) 
 
0.62* 
(1.93) 
 
0.77* 
(2.06) 
0.81* 
(2.17) 
   0.88* 
   (2.41) 
Inflation*Euro -0.05* 
(-1.83 ) 
-0.29 
(-0.56 ) 
-0.35 
(-0.43) 
-0.71 
(-0.12) 
-0.58 
(1.01) 
-0.11* 
(-1.98 ) 
-0.21 
(-1.31 ) 
Openness*euro 1.59* 
(2.16) 
4.73 
(0.72) 
3.31 
(1.21) 
3.89 
(0.87) 
2.57 
(0.96) 
1.87** 
(2.89) 
0.77 
(0.51) 
Market 
capitalization 
0.11* 
(1.78) 
0.14* 
(2.16) 
0.09* 
(1.91) 
0.75 
(1.27) 
0.71 
(0.41) 
0.19* 
(2.12) 
    0.09* 
   (2.01) 
Eu 1.85* 
(2.63 ) 
1.12* 
(1.71 ) 
 1.37* 
(1.72) 
 0.98 
(1.12) 
 0.71 
(1.03) 
 1.25* 
( 2.81 ) 
   1.78* 
(1.85 ) 
Population 0.91 
(1.08) 
0.86 
(1.09) 
0.72 
(0.84) 
1.31 
(1.22) 
0.67 
(0.52) 
0.51 
(0.74) 
0.42 
(1.08) 
Unemployment -0.09 
(-0.39) 
-0.08 
(-0.02) 
-0.12 
(-0.31) 
-0.17 
(-0.95) 
-0.14 
(-0.23) 
-0.03 
(-0.21) 
-0.05 
(-0.02) 
Wages -0.31 
(-0.11) 
-0.42 
(-0.17) 
-0.18 
(-0.05) 
-0.28 
(-0.09) 
-0.51 
(-0.12) 
 
-0.72 
(-0.18) 
-0.49 
(-0.11) 
Rsquared 
 
0.58 
 
0.61 
 
0.56 
 
0.55 
 
0.52 
 
0.67 
 
0.56 
 
F-test 481.11 841.61 619.81 533.81 801.71 359.17 229.44 
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Notes:  
1. T-statistics are given in parentheses. Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity, and are 
clustered by year to allow for spatial correlation in the errors. Also, *, **, and ***, respectively, 
indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels. 
2. Neighboring explanatory variables are used as instruments for both spatial and economic weights. 
3. European Union of 17 (#) members refers to the case before the expansion of EU in 2004 and 
includes Switzerland and Norway. European Union of 27 (##) members refers to the case after the 
expansion of EU in 2004 and covers the period 1993-2005. 
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4. Temporal dependence  
 
 
 
 
Estimation 
Methoda
 
Dependent Variable: 
Marginal tax rate, corporate rate (%) 
 
(1) 
FGLS 
(2) 
 PW-
PCSE 
        (3) 
     FGLS  
  (4) 
 PW-
PCSE 
     (5) 
     FGLS 
 
      (6) 
PW-     
PCSE 
Constant 9.23* 
(1.78) 
7.43* 
(1.98) 
 2.42 
(1.05) 
8.47* 
(2.88) 
6.15* 
(1.95) 
4.31* 
(1.88) 
Spatial 
Neighboring 
taxes 
0.19* 
(1.87) 
0.37* 
(1.88) 
0.42* 
(2.02) 
0.44* 
(1.78) 
0.38* 
(1.76) 
0.35* 
(1.75) 
Economic 
Neighboring 
taxes 
     0.54** 
(2.59) 
0.78* 
(1.89) 
0.58* 
(2.01) 
0.79* 
(1.78) 
0.94* 
(1.75) 
0.84* 
(1.72) 
Lagged taxes   0.77** 
(2.64) 
0.89* 
(1.73) 
0.95* 
(2.02) 
0.82** 
(2.89) 
Agriculture, 
value added  
0.58 
(1.02) 
2.11* 
(2.07) 
0.54* 
(1.89) 
2.31** 
(2.71) 
1.06 
(0.56) 
0.86 
(0.15) 
Gdp -2.47* 
(-1.96) 
-0.78** 
(-2.77) 
-2.59* 
(-2.08) 
-0.68* 
(-2.36) 
-1.14* 
(-1.86) 
-1.28* 
(-1.89) 
Debt 0.37* 
(1.81) 
0.31* 
(1.94) 
0.42* 
(1.89) 
 
0.35* 
(1.77) 
 
0.45* 
(2.01) 
0.51* 
(2.11) 
Inflation 0.45 
(0.58) 
0.02* 
(1.92) 
0.37 
(1.05) 
0.01 
(1.68) 
0.05* 
(1.81) 
0.07* 
(1.89) 
openness 0.09 
(1.35) 
0.15 
(1.02) 
0.06* 
(1.97) 
0.07* 
(1.86) 
0.09* 
(1.73) 
0.09* 
(1.73) 
Euro -1.03* 
(-1.98) 
-2.05* 
(-1.71) 
-1.14 
(-1.68) 
-1.96* 
(-2.07) 
  -1.34** 
(-2.67) 
  -1.11* 
(-2.01) 
Eu 0.19* 
(1.99) 
0.28* 
(1.85) 
0.23* 
(1.76) 
0.33* 
(2.19) 
0.42* 
(1.88) 
0.43* 
(1.93) 
Market 
capitalization 
-0.11 
(-0.01) 
-0.05 
(-0.74) 
-0.09 
(-1.23) 
-0.07 
(-1.24) 
-0.19 
(-1.01) 
-0.25 
(-0.95) 
Population 0.64* 
(1.78) 
0.29 
(1.07) 
0.53* 
(1.89) 
0.41* 
(1.77) 
0.51* 
(1.81) 
0.45* 
(1.88) 
Unemployment -0.15 
(-0.79) 
-0.27 
(-0.52) 
-0.18 
(-0.39) 
-0.24 
(-0.23) 
-0.12 
(-0.36) 
-0.28 
(-0.23) 
Wages 
 
 
-0.12 
(-1.54) 
 
-0.14 
(-1.03) 
 
-0.09* 
(-1.94) 
 
-0.08* 
(-2.01) 
 
-0.05* 
(-1.83) 
 
-0.06* 
(-1.89) 
 
rho 0.279             0.279 -0.117 -0.117 0.089 0.089 
       
Rsquared  0.78  0.79  0.79 
Year Effects No No Yes Yes Yes     Yes 
 
Notes: T-statistics are given in parentheses. Also, *, **, and ***, respectively, indicate statistical 
significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels. 
a
FGLS= feasible GLS estimation; PW-PCSE= Prais-Winsten estimation with panel-corrected 
standard errors. 
 
